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PREFACE
This dissertation grew out of an enthusiasm for linguistics in general and
computational linguistics specifically that I discovered while working on my masters
degree.
The core of this work centers around Ontological Semantics Technology, a
form of natural language processing which uses an ontology to structure its semantic
meaning. I became interested in how this might leverage other, parallel
developments in machine learning. To that end I began a series of experiments to
determine empirically how ontology-based natural language processing performs
when compared to established approaches used in statistical machine learning.
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ABSTRACT

Falk, Courtney Ph.D., Purdue University, August 2016. Knowledge Modeling of
Phishing Emails. Major Professors: Victor Raskin and Julia Taylor.

This dissertation describes the knowledge modeling necessary to semantically
understand phishing emails. Samples of both good, non-malicious emails and
phishing, malicious emails are processed manually. The results of the processing is
analyzed for indicators in the semantic structure that might aid in the identification
of phishing emails.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
One would soon go mad if one took
such coincidences too seriously. One
might be led to suspect that there
were all sorts of things going on in
the Universe which he or she did
not thoroughly understand.
Kurt Vonnegut
Bluebeard

This chapter introduces the reader to the basic concepts involved with the
problem of phishing, how phishing attacks work, and the current scope of the
problem.
Trends in cyber attacks ebb and flow. But phishing is a class of cyber
attacks that spans these trends. What makes phishing a perennially attractive
choice for attackers? The reason is because the key component to the success of any
phishing attack, the human user, will always be reachable. Firewalls can stop
remote exploits from reaching vulnerable servers, and armed guards are a good
deterrent against physical intruders, but humans need to communicate in order to
work effectively and these communications channels are all the opening needed to
create a successful phishing attack.

1.1 Definition
In order to sign up for America Online (AOL) a person must provide a credit
card number. But in the early days of AOL there was a flaw in their account
creation system; the credit card numbers were not confirmed as being active. This
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meant that someone could create a valid credit card number, one that didn’t match
an existing account, and use it to create an AOL account. Even in the early 1990s
the software existed and was widely available to generate credit card numbers.
Hackers would use this technique to get initial access to online services and then use
that first account to pivot, stealing other, legitimate accounts in order to maintain
an online presence. It was these stolen accounts of paying members that were called
“phish”, and the act of stealing the accounts was called “phishing.”
In January of 1996, user “Weapon X” on the alt.2600 newsgroup explained
the motivation of the phishing attack sequence:
First off, WHY would you want to go back to AOL once you get a real
inet acct? I was stupid enough to bother with that fake acct/phishing
period back in the day, but right now, from what i hear, the best way is
to use the generated cc#s, and use the maybe 5-10 minutes you have,
and go phishing... Then from that phish, keep phishing from that one
(use side accts of coarse [sic]...) Weapon X (1996)
Eventually manual phishing on AOL was automated thanks to the AOHell
tool (Langberg, 1995). AOHell offered hackers a graphical interface tool to
facilitate multiple different acts of mischief on AOL, not the least of which was the
phishing for other users’ credentials.
The term “phishing” creates a vivid analogy: The attacker is the fisherman,
casting a baited hook out to where he suspects it will be noticed by victims. These
victims are the fish, entranced by a shiny bauble and suckered into taking the bait.
When the fish bite onto the hook then the angler reels them in to complete the
attack.
Even the way that “phishing” is spelled gives clues to its origin. The correct
spelling is with an “f”, pronounced as a fricative. There are places in English
orthography where the “ph” consonant cluster also is pronounced as a fricative, but
in these cases it suggests a Greek origin for the word. “Fishing” is not one of those
words. So why the spelling tweak?
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Phreaking was a hacker activity that predates phishing by decades going all
the way back into the 1970s when “Captain Crunch” (John Draper), Steve Jobs,
and Steve Wozniak were creating hardware to defraud the telephone companies of
free long distance service (Wozniak & Smith, 2006).
The term, “phreaking,” is a portmanteau of “phone” and “freaking”. Over
time hackers began substituting “ph” for “f” in arbitrary places, creating leetspeak
slang. But in the case of phishing the “ph” has a stronger tie back to the original
intent of phreaking as an inherently social activity that requires reaching out to
other human users (Sterling, 1993).
Over time semantic drift caused the meaning of the phish- neologisms to
change. “Phishing” now means the act of using social engineering to coerce a user
into giving up personal information or access to personal resources.
Social engineering itself is just a modern day confidence scam with successful
conmen like Kevin Mitnick gaining celebrity status within both the hacker and
information security communities (Mitnick & Simon, 2002).

1.2 Unsolicited Email
Phishing emails are sometimes discussed in conjunction with spam
emails (James, 2005). The two categories do share one unifying attribute in that
they are both unsolicited contacts. But there are substantive differences between
the two.
Phishing
Spam

Non-Content

Content

Figure 1.1. The relationship between spam and phishing concepts.
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The key different between spam emails and phishing attack emails is the
intended end action on the part of the targeted user. With spam emails a company
hires an intermediary spam marketer to deluge large numbers of email addresses
with unsolicited offers for products and services. Some of these products and
services are of dubious legality and quality. But the spammer only cares about the
raw number of spam emails set and their conversion rate into hits on the client’s
web site.
Phishers, as opposed to spammers, are serving their own goals. If a phisher
sends out a phishing email then he/she wants to collect the targeted user’s
information or resources for personal use. Sometimes the attack itself belies the
intended use of the user’s information or resource. A phishing email that requests
details of financial accounts likely wants to use that information to steal money out
of the account in question. Whereas a phishing email that tries to exploit a software
vulnerability on a user’s computer wants the resources that come with being able to
run software on someone else’s machine; bandwidth and disk space to name two.

1.2.1 Spam
Spam is the unsolicited emailing of offers for products and services. The
users receiving the spam emails may not be of the target audience for the products
and services in question.
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Figure 1.2. The sequence of events in a spam campaign.

Figure 1.2 shows the events and messages involved in an end-to-end spam
email campaign. In this example, a third party has hired a spammer to send
unsolicited product offers to email addresses across the Internet. The goal is to
entice some number of spam recipients into paying customers of the third party.
The target user doesn’t need to ever interact again with the spammer again.

1.2.2 Phishing for Credentials
The theft of user login credentials is where phishing began. Once an attacker
had a user’s login name and password the attacker could log in as that user and
steal whatever resources that account might have access to. In the case of the AOL
account theft described previously, the attacker wants to steal Internet access.
With the advent of online banking came the specter of phishing for bank
login credentials (Sangani, 2003). Once an attacker can log into a bank online as a
victim there is very little keeping the attacker from transferring the entire balance of
the victim’s accounts to accounts that belong to the attacker. This fraud is
sometimes reimbursed by the victim’s bank. The reimbursement costs get passed on
to all the users of the bank by way of increased fees.
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Figure 1.3. Phishing for account information.

Figure 1.3 makes it immediately obvious what the difference between
spamming and phishing. The phisher wants to steal a target user’s information for
the purposes of making fraudulent withdrawals from the target’s bank account.

1.2.3 Phishing to Exploit Computers
As hackers became more savvy about computer security and reverse
engineering they began to better exploit software vulnerabilities. Then the
underground hacker magazine, Phrack, released an article with detailed instructions
on how buffer overflow vulnerabilities could be exploited (Aleph One, 1996). This
led to a proliferation in exploits for vulnerabilities in software of all types.
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Figure 1.4. Phishing for computing resources.

There is a difference in the technical requirements for a phishing attack that
only wants to steal information and a phishing attack that targets computing
resources. The former interacts only with the human user and can use the same
phishing script through email, instant message, or social network. A phishing attack
that relies on malware to steal computing resources has added technical
requirements. An exploit requires certain operating system and software versions,
and can be defeated by anti-virus software and other defensive measures. Both
types of phishers need to have at least an understanding of the targets’ language
and culture.
Phish
Resource

Account

Exploit

Request
Response

Browser

Form

E-Mail Web Site

Local

Link Attachment

Web site

Figure 1.5. A brief taxonomy of four types of phishing attacks.
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Figure 1.5 shows a taxonomy of how different types of phishing attacks are
related. At the top level of the taxonomy, the distinction between Request and
Exploit phishing attacks is that the Request attack is targeting account information
(“Account”) while the Exploit attack wants to appropriate someone else’s computer
resources (“Resource”).
Request-type attacks divide into E-Mail and Web Site subtypes. The
differentiating factor is how the attacker desires for the victim to complete the
attack. In E-Mail attacks the victim writes a response email with the included
account information. In Web Site attacks the victim follows a URL to a web page
that is mocked up to look legitimate. For instance, if the phishing email claims to
be from Bank of America then the URL will lead to a phony web page made to look
like the actual Bank of America login page. The victim enters his/her account
credentials and the attack is complete.
The Exploit attack is subdivided into Link and Attachment types. Link-type
exploit attacks try to entice a user to follow a URL in the email that opens a
malicious web page which will in turn attempt to exploit that user’s web
browser (Howard, 2012). Local-type exploit attacks include the exploit code as a
component of the message either encoded in the body text or as an attachment,
depending on the type of vulnerability targeted by the exploit.
Figure 1.5 includes a dotted line between the Web Site and Link attack
subtypes. This signifies that both types of attacks lure the victim to a web site. The
dotted line then indicates this commonality between the two attacks. The difference
between Web Site and Link attacks is explained in the taxonomy by how they
branch off from the different Request and Exploit attack types respectively. But
these two attacks are not mutually exclusive. In fact, a savvy phisher might include
both forms of attack on the same web page so that even if a victim gets cold feet
before entering the account information there is still the chance that the embedded
exploit has worked, giving the phisher remote access to the victim’s computer.
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1.3 Quantifying The Problem
Several public security companies record and report data concerning phishing
attacks. The trends that these reports describe is not encouraging.
Phishing Email over Time
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Figure 1.6. Number of reported phishing emails collected by APWG.

The chart in Figure 1.6 shows the trend of phishing emails reported to
APWG in the period beginning first quarter of 2008 and ending after the first
quarter of 2016. The numbers reported by (RSA, 2014) for the same period of 1Q
2013 show an increase in phishing activity, which contradicts the APWG data.
Allowing for a certain amount of volatility still highlights a trend of increasing
number of phishing attacks.
One tool utilized by phishers is the PDF exploit. The PDF document format
is a popular vector for several reasons. First, the design goal of PDF is to be
cross-platform so PDF readers exist for every major operating system, including
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mobile operating systems. Second, the PDF file format is text-based, and
text-based parsers are frequently subject to bugs in their source code that lead to
code execution vulnerabilities.
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Figure 1.7. The trend in the number of PDF vulnerabilities over time,
independent of product.

Figure 1.7 above shows the trend of reported PDF vulnerabilities according
to MITRE’s CVE database (MITRE, 2016). These data are for vulnerabilities
disclosed prior to July, 2016. Also note that the exploits do not belong to any one
particular product such as Adobe Reader, but rather belong to a variety of different
pieces of PDF rendering software. A total of 411 different PDF vulnerabilities were
reported.
Unique PDF vulnerabilities peak in 2009. What changed in 2009 was that
Adobe instituted a regular, quarterly patch cycle followed by improvements in the
security model used for the Adobe Reader software package (Adobe Product
Security Incident Response Team, 2012). After the improvements of 2009 the

11
current trend is for PDF vulnerabilities to maintain a steady average around 30 per
year with 2016 on track to meet or exceed that number.

1.4 Ransomware
Ransomware is a subclass of malware with a particular method of operation.
After a computer is infected by ransomware the program begins encrypting different
types of files like documents and spreadsheets. The user is then unable to access
their own files. The ransomware alerts the user to the compromise and provides a
series of steps necessary to decrypt the affected files (Microsoft Malware Protection
Center, 2016).
Phishing attacks are a popular vector for delivering ransomware. Phishing
data collected by PhishMe for the month of March 2016 that shows over half the
malware taken from phishing emails is ransomware (2016).
One solution to being infected with ransomware is simple: pay the ransom.
Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center succeeded with this approach. They paid
their ransomers 40 bitcoins (around $17,000 at the time of writing1 ) and received a
cryptographic key for use in decrypting their ransomed files (Winton, 2016).
But paying the ransom is no guarantee of relief. Because ransomware is a
crime so there is no contract in place to enforce that the ransomer will in fact follow
through on his/her of the bargain. This is exactly what happened to another
hospital, Kansas Heart Hospital in Wichita. They paid their ransom only to have
the criminals turn around and demand even more cash (Sun, 2016).

1.5 Research Question
Phishing continues to be a serious problem for the information security
community. Research into the phishing problem is ongoing and discussed in more
detail in the following chapter. But much of this research looks at the language of
1

Bitcoin’s value relative to other currencies is highly volatile.
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the phishing email as a secondary indicator, or somehow less important than the
unambiguous technical details that are provided via the SMTP protocol. And those
research projects that do look into phishing language stay at the shallow end of
natural language processing. There is a lack of research into the semantic meaning
behind phishing emails. Having insight into the structured meaning underpinning
these phishing emails could provide better, more flexible solutions in fighting them.
There are two parts to the research question for this dissertation. The first
part is: What would the semantic representation of known good emails and phishing
emails look like? And second: Do the semantics differ enough between the two to
enable semantic analysis and distinction? The end goal for the second part of the
research question would be a system that could automatically distinguish between
good and phishing emails based on their semantic parses. But building a complete
system to do this is outside the scope of this dissertation.

1.6 Delimitations
Delimitations, as opposed to limitations, are explicit decisions on the part of
the researcher that restrict the scope of the research.
One important delimitation in this research is the focus on phishing emails
with malicious PDF attachments. The reason for this delimitation is two-fold. First,
PDF files capable of exploiting a vulnerability in the software on a user’s machine
do not occur at random. The odds of such an occurrence are statistically impossible
due to the sheer number of complementary changes needed to a valid file. The
attaching of a malicious PDF file is there a guaranteed sign that the goal of the
email is to make a phishing victim out of the end user. Second, PDF files are
primarily text documents. Focusing on a particular type of file means limiting the
number of action verbs related to that file type. A user doesn’t “execute” or “run”
a PDF the way one would a PE32 .exe binary. Or a user wouldn’t “listen to” or
“play” a PDF in the same way as an MP3 audio file. Since the goal of this
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dissertation is to search for and identify triggers in the text that would cause a user
to complete the phishing attack, it seems prudent to limit the number of variables
involved. In this case, one of the variables is the set of all possible action verbs.

1.7 Limitations
Limitations are present in any research endeavor. Understanding and
explaining the limitations of the chosen approaches is necessary in supporting the
arguments that naturally follow. A researcher who cannot explain the model or
theory used may have built the entire research program on faulty assumptions and
bad logic.
There are limitations inherent with using a knowledge-base approach such as
that of ontological semantics. The expressive power of the ontology and lexicon may
prove insufficient to describe all possible text found in phishing emails. No one
individual has enough time or energy to define all the necessary resources. That
commitment is certainly outside the time frame of any dissertation.
The proposed solution to this limitation is to create concepts and lexemes,
from the ontology and lexicon respectively, on the fly as the email messages are
analyzed. This makes the assumption that the way these resources are defined is
both coherent and valid within the scope of ontological semantics. Such an
approach would make for an inefficient way to acquire resources in the long run due
to the additional work necessary to scaffold together all the disparate pieces.

1.8 Summary
This introduction chapter presented the basic concept of phishing emails. It
then established why phishing emails continue to be an important problem in the
field of information security. After establishing the severity of the problem, the
proposed dissertation research is described in regards to its goals, limitations, and
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delimitations. The following chapters continue to build on and expand on these
themes.
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CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
Like all men of the Library, I have
traveled in my youth; I have
wandered in search of a book,
perhaps the catalogue of
catalogues...
Jorge Luis Borges
“The Library of Babel”

This chapter addresses the review of literature relevant to the dissertation.
The literature review covers several different topics due to the different solutions to
phishing that were proposed over time. The goal of this chapter is then to provide a
narrative for these previous works and explain their importance to the original work
described later.

2.1 Information Security
This dissertation addresses a problem central to information security. The
past decade has seen an increase in the general awareness regarding information
security problems. Dr. Matt Bishop of the University of California, Davis authored
the first authoritative and comprehensive textbook on information security (Bishop,
2002). Bishop’s text covers a wide range of topics from information security to
cryptography and malware. Once the theoretical basis of information was
established the next logical question was: What real world information security
questions might be answered via the experimental method. Long after Bishop, Dr.
Josiah Dykstra wrote the text on how information/cyber security might become an

16
experimental science (Dykstra, 2016). Dykstra’s book begins with the scientific
method and then describes different scenarios for its application.
One way of understanding security is to begin by understanding the
attackers. In 2011, Lockheed Martin produced a paper where they borrowed the
concept of the “kill chain” from the military and applied it to cyber
defense (Hutchins, Cloppert, & Amin, 2011). The original military idea of a kill
chain was the set of procedures necessary to identify and destroy a time-sensitive
target as embodied by the unwieldy acronym, F2T2EA (“Find, Fix, Track, Target,
Engage, Assess,” Tirpak, 2000).
The cyber kill chain identifies the steps of a cyber attack in terms of
increasing level of severity beginning at target reconnaissance and ending with a
hacker remotely interacting with the target machine. Each step in the cyber kill
chain has different indicators of activity and as such has different preventative and
remediative measures available.
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Figure 2.1. The Lockheed Martin cyber kill chain model.

Phishing attacks would sit at step three of the cyber kill chain, delivery. The
phisher has already identified targets and prepared an attack. Now all that needs to
happen for the attack to succeed is for the victim to perform some action. If the
potential victim does not perform that action then the attack fails and all further
steps in the cyber kill chain are prevented. Prevention of this attack can be
accomplished by education and awareness training and/or technical preventative
measures that either keep the phishing email from reaching the intended recipient or
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prevent the attack portion from succeeding despite the victim performing the
attacker’s desired action (Kumaraguru, Sheng, Acquisti, Cranor, & Hong, 2010).

2.1.1 Social Engineering
Kevin Mitnick was a successful computer criminal until his
arrest (Shimomura, 1996). He has since parlayed his high profile court case into a
security consulting and speaking career. Many of Mitnick’s successes as a hacker
came not from superior technical tools or know-how, but rather from social
engineering the necessary information for his attacks from the victims themselves.
Social engineering itself is a modern euphemism for a confidence scam. In
fact, when Mitnick wrote a book on social engineering with several case studies on
different attacks he concluded each attack with a section headlined, “Analyzing the
Con.” (Mitnick & Simon, 2002) Chapter seven of that book is titled, “Phony Sites
and Dangerous Attachments,” and addresses specifically the social engineering
involved with phishing attacks.
Even creating phishing emails for the attack phase can be done using
automated tools. SpearPhisher from TrustedSec (2013) is intended for use by
information security professionals who conduct penetration testing as a part of their
regular responsibilities. Metasploit, the popular crowd-sourced exploit framework
produced by Rapid7 (2012) also facilitates the creation of phishing emails. What
these tools have in common is their ability to incorporate a template email message
with a list of name-email address tuples and a malicious payload. The tool
generates all desired email with a minimum of interaction on the part of the
phisher. This removes the skill requirement for phishing attacks, lowering the
barrier to entry, and enabling more attackers.
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2.1.2 Software Exploits
Computer software can contain flaws that are otherwise known as “bugs” in
computer science parlance. The more complex the software product the more likely
it is to contain bugs (Mayer, 2012). When such a bug is exposed to the outside
world it creates a vulnerability that threatens not just the individual piece of
software in question but the system that software is running on and perhaps the
entire network that that system belongs to. Exploits are pieces of software specially
crafted to use one or more vulnerabilities in order to manipulate a computer system
into functioning in an unintended way (Koziol et al., 2004).
Not all vulnerabilities are the same. Some vulnerabilities leak information
used by the vulnerable software or stored elsewhere on the system (Tsipenyuk,
Chess, & McGraw, 2005). Other vulnerabilities cause the software to crash or
become unresponsive when exploited. These kinds of bugs can create denials of
service where system availability is compromised. But the most severe type of
vulnerability (Microsoft Security TechCenter, 2012) is the kind that when exploited
allows the attacker to execute arbitrary instructions on the system in a kind of
“weird machine state” (Dullian, 2011). These remote execution vulnerabilities give
hackers from distant networks potentially unrestricted access to the system and all
of its resources (Open Web Application Security Project, 2013).

2.1.3 Exploit Kits
Exploit kits are just one type of tool used by phishers (Segura, 2015). The
kits collect together software exploits that target vulnerabilities in web browsers or
other web browser components. Examples of popular exploit kits include Angler,
Nuclear, Magnitude, and Neutrino (J. C. Chen & Li, 2015; Howard, 2012). The
phisher establishes a publicly accessible web server somewhere on the Internet.
Then attack emails are sent out with links back to the exploit kit server in the
hopes that users follow the link using a vulnerable browser and get their computer
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exploited. This is an effective way to deliver malicious PDF attachments such as
those being examined in this research (Stock, Livshits, & Zorn, 2015).
Sometimes these kits include OPSEC features to help protect the phisher’s
investment in infrastructure and increase the number of successful attacks. For
example, the malicious link to the exploit kit server might embed a unique
identifier. The first time the server receives a connection request using that ID it
will attempt an exploit. But subsequent attempts using a previously seen ID will
simply serve innocuous content and attempt no exploitation. This way, if the link is
forwarded to a security professional for in-depth analysis, it is less likely that the
professional can trigger the server into openly demonstrating its malicious behavior.

2.1.4 Related Attacks
Examiners of phishing have subdivided this class of cyber attack into smaller
pieces over the years based on differing sets of criteria. One subclass of phishing
attack that has reached the public media is that of spear phishing.
Spear fishing, the original and properly spelled term, differs from more
common rod and reel fishing in that the fisherman must pierce a single fish with a
lengthy spear. To do that the fisherman must first identify and target a particular
fish. The angler doesn’t necessarily target a specific fish but rather casts the bait
out and waits for any fish at all to take the bait and hook themselves. Spear
phishing when compared to the more general type of phishing attack is analogous to
the real world distinction between the two types of fishing. Whereas a phisher sends
large amounts of emails with the hopes of catching a few victims, the spear phisher
targets a single particular target and crafts the message of the phishing attack to
that one target.
Whaling is spear phishing with a narrower focus. The targets of whaling, the
“whales”, are determined by the attacker to have a higher value than the other
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users, which in this analogy are common fish to be ignored. CEOs, politicians, or
celebrities are all potential whales.
On the African savanna water is a scarce and valuable resource. Seasonal
water holes offer temporary sources of water to any animal fortunate enough to find
them. Predators know this fact as well. Lions, alligators, and other apex predators
stake out these water holes, waiting for prey animals to feel the pang of thirst and
wander into striking distance. Water hole cyber attacks are analogous to the kind of
attacks that these African predators execute. A water hole attack begins when the
attacker identifies a web site or other Internet-based resource frequented by many
users. The attack then compromises the site via vulnerabilities in the host system
and inserts his/her own malicious content into what was originally hosted. Now all
the attacker has to do is wait for unsuspecting users to visit the compromised site
and fall prey to the software exploit waiting for them.

2.2 Knowledge-Based Theory
When beginning to research a new field it is often helpful to have a definitive
text of that field to use as a starting point. For knowledge representation the
foundational text is Sowa (2000). John Sowa presents a large and diverse number of
theories in the realm of knowledge representation and discusses each in turn as to
its expressive power and other attributes.

2.3 Machine Learning
Machine learning is the field of computer science that applies algorithms to
data sets in order to automatically find patterns that are not obvious to humans
either due to the complexity of the pattern or the large amount of data involved.
ML itself is considered a subfield of artificial intelligence (AI) where the goal
is the computational generation of models. The basic theory and foundation of AI is
established well by Russell and Norvig in Artificial Intelligence: A Modern
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Approach (2003). The broad range of material presented in the book, along with the
mixture of theoretical grounding combined with practical examples, make this text
the book of choice for many university artificial intelligence courses.1
The learning part of machine learning is grouped into three general
categories: supervised, unsupervised, and semi-supervised.
Unsupervised Training data is provided as-is without any labels.
Supervised All training data is labeled.
Semi-supervised A combination of unsupervised and supervised training
methods. Often use when there is a large amount of data or labeling data is
expensive or time-consuming.
Supervised learning approaches typically perform better than unsupervised
approaches for the same data/problem. This fits the intuition that being able to
better describe your input data produces more accurate results when the trained
model is applied to test data. But sometimes a complete structure of the data is
unknown. Or a sufficient labeled corpus doesn’t exist. In these situation
unsupervised ML can provide an answer.
Data mining is another subfield of AI and is closely related to ML. The key
different between data mining and ML is that data mining prioritizes the search
aspects examining data while ML takes the techniques and tools of data mining to
utilize large amounts of data. Together the two subfields work synergistically.
Witten, Eibe, and Hall establishes the ideas and techniques of data mining and
machine learning (2011). If the authors’ names sound familiar it would be because
they are three of the creaters of the WEKA machine learning toolkit that will prove
of central importance to this research (Hall et al., 2009).
Different ML algorithms perform better on particular kinds of features.
Investigating this in regards to semantic features is part of the focus of this
1

UC Berkeley maintains a list of universities that use this book on their web site at:
http://aima.cs.berkeley.edu/adoptions.html
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research. An alternative to a single ML technique that performs well on all types of
features is combining different ML techniques together in order to derive the best
aspects of the different parts. Combined ML algorithms together is known as
ensemble machine learning.
There exist a wide variety of ensemble ML techniques. In a voting ensemble
approach the component ML algorithms all get a “vote” in the resulting classifier.
Random forests build a single classifier from a collection of decision trees each
trained on a random subset of samples (Breiman, 2001). There is also boosting, a
technique that focuses on taking a collection of “weak” classifiers and assembling
them together into a single, “strong” classifier (Breiman, 1998). These are just a
sample of the various ensemble techniques currently available.

2.4 Phishing Detection
Phishing detection is an area of ongoing research. No definitive solution has
been found to date. This is likely due to the fact that phishing attacks succeed or
fail on their ability to interact with a real human, and processing and analyzing text
in a way similar to how humans perform those tasks remains an unsolved problem.
Still, there are a few different avenues being pursued.
First addressed is general machine learning (ML). There are several useful
contributions that ML-based phishing detection approaches make.
The next area is natural language processing (NLP). Many current NLP
approaches use ML techniques. But while the preceding ML section focuses on
solutions that use features derived from email meta data, NLP approaches extend
the research into looking for useful feature derived from email message bodies.

2.4.1 Features
Sometimes the features chosen for ML aren’t just linguistic but also include
meta data. Meta data would be information not explicitly stated in the content but
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rather gained by examining the artifact in which the text is presented.
CANTINA+ (Xiang, Hong, Rose, & Cranor, 2011), and its preceding version,
CANTINA Yue, Hong, and Cranor (2007), rely on these kinds of meta data features.
The goal of CANTINA+ is to identify phishing web pages. These are web
pages that mimic existing web pages of companies such as banks and email
providers. An unsuspecting user is directed to the phishing page via an email
prompt to log in. The phishing web page interceptions the user login credentials,
allowing the phisher to log in as the victim. Because phishing web pages are often
scraped versions of legitimate web pages, using content-based features won’t
distinguish them from their good counterparts. CANTINA+ focuses on meta data
features such as:
1. Domain - Aspects of the URL used for the web page such as the number of
subdomains, if an IP address is used in the URL, or embedding other domain
names as a part of the larger phishing domain name.
2. HTML - The relative location of validation scripts for the web page form or
when the anchor text mismatches with the corresponding tag’s URL.
3. Web - How long ago the domain name was registered, Google PageRank score,
or TF-IDF scores for the suspect page versus the page given as the top search
result for the same brand name.
The first two types of features, domain and HTML, are fairly static. That is
to say, evaluating a given web page against these features will not generate different
feature scores over different periods of time. However, the third type of feature,
web, is dynamic sensitive to changes because it has external dependencies on
web-based services such as search. Running a search to retrieve scores for the
features will likely generate different results over time. This makes replicating the
research results difficult and possibly complicates generalizing the results.
Another interesting point to note about the evolution from CANTINA to
CANTINA+ is that in CANTINA the researchers wrote their own metric by hand.
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They could do this because the number of features they were using was relatively
small. When dealing with small numbers of features it is possible for a human to
manually write a metric or heuristic that performs competitively. But with the
CANTINA+ project the number of features used grew, as suggested by the article
title. When working on CANTINA+ the researchers decided that they needed to
use ML techniques to develop classifiers using this large assortment of features on
hand. Their work utilized naive Bayes, logistic regression, and SVM to train
classifiers among other algorithms.
The two CANTINA projects are frequently cited by other phishing research
efforts. But their focus is on identifying web pages used to steal user credentials in
phising attacks. Refer back to the model depicted in Figure 1.5 to see how this type
of phishing fits in the bigger picture of phishing attacks.
CANTINA+ inspired a number of different follow-on research projects to
include PILFER (Fette, Sadeh, & Tomasic, 2007), phishGILLNET (Ramathan &
Wechsler, 2012), and PhishAri (Aggarwal, Rajadesingan, & Kumaraguru, 2012).
Where PhishAri differs from PILFER and phishGILLNET is its focus on phishing
via the web site, Twitter, instead of the more general task of identifying phishing
web pages.

2.4.2 Natural Language Processing
Language poses an additional set of problems for ML approaches. Years of
linguistic research has shown different types of structure present in language. For
ML to perform NLP well it needs to needs to account for these structures via some
kind of model.
Noted linguist Dan Jurafsky writes extensively on NLP. His text, Speech and
Language Processing, serves as an excellent bridge from the Russell and Norvig’s
more general, Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach.
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Ontological semantics, the language-centric knowledge-base approach to NLP
utilized in this research, is not a newcomer to the problems of information security.
Theoretical foundations exist for a number of information assurance and security
problems such as watermarking, anonymization, and document sanitization (Raskin,
Hempelmann, Triezenberg, & Nirenburg, 2001; Raskin, Nirenburg, Atallah,
Hempelmann, & Triezenberg, 2002; Raskin & Taylor, 2013).
Just as there are several levels of evaluation used in linguistics, so too are
there several comparable levels of features that an NLP solution might utilize.

2.4.2.1. Surface Features

ML approaches for NLP often begin with what are known as surface
features. These are strings of text extracted from the target corpus. The attraction
to surface features is that they’re very easy to extract in an automated fashion with
a minimum of prior training or supervision.
N-grams are one of the most commonly used types of surface features where
the gram is just a word. The N parameter defines how many words concatenated
together should be considered as a single feature. A unigram model (or 1-gram)
would create a feature for each and every word in the text. A bigram model (or
2-gram) creates a feature for each possible two word sequence. For example, the
text, “How now brown cow,” would generate four unigram features or three bigram
features. Usually trigrams are the longest size of gram chosen due to the fact that
increasingly longer grams failed to provide improved results.
Some experiments also combine different sizes of N. Both unigram and
bigram features might be considered together if they are shown to improve the
results produced by the model.
N-gram language models can create an explosion of features. A larger
number of features slows processing and potentially decreases the accuracy of the
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Table 2.1
An example of different length N-grams.
“How now brown cow”
Unigrams

“How”, “now”, “brown”, “cow”

Bigrams

“How now”, “now brown”, “brown cow”

Trigrams

“How now brown”, “now brown cow”

model. To help lower the number of features and remove features of the language
model that contribute little to the accuracy, ML practitioners turn to morphological
analysis and filtering.
Morphological analysis is one processing technique that can help cut down on
the number of grams generated. Linguists describe written words according to basic
units called morphemes. Many languages allow changes and additions to these basic
morphemes in order to derive new meaning without having to create an entirely new
word. Reversing these additions in order to obtain the core morpheme of the gram
is how morphological analysis works. Analysis techniques differ from language to
language and require a scientific level of linguistic research in order to develop.
In addition to morphological analysis, ML techniques might also filter out
what are known as stop words as a pre-processing technique. These are common
words in a language, often belonging to closed classes of words such as articles and
prepositions. Stop words usually serve a functional purpose and stand in contrast to
content words from which most meaning is derived.
Aggarwal, Kumar, and Sundarsan (2014) improve on their prior work on the
PhishAri project (Aggarwal et al., 2012), by examining linguistic features in
addition to the meta data features previously used. The approach is largely
enumerative:
1. Monetary terms and symbols
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2. Words like “reply” and related synonyms
3. Time-sensitive words and synonyms thereof (urgency)
The ability to use synonyms comes from relying on the WordNet database.
WordNet is a large collection of English words with connections between
synonyms (Princeton University, 2010). Its popularity among researchers comes
from its free cost, its large coverage of words within the English language, and the
associated linguistic meta data about connections between words. These connections
are often used in NLP approaches that advocate semantic levels of processing.

2.4.2.2. Syntactic Features

Gilchan Park of Purdue University took a step beyond linguistic surface
features (Park, 2013). Stop word filtering. Park’s work was inspired by another
project at Purdue University, PhishNet (Prakash, Kumar, Kompella, & Gupta,
2010). The focus on the research is identifying salient action verbs. A part of speech
(POS) tagger is applied to the token stream to identify which words are most likely
the verbs. These potential verbs are checked against a like of action verbs and their
synonyms.
Park himself didn’t stop with his masters thesis. A 2014 paper conducted an
empirical study comparing both machine learning classifiers to humans assigned
with the same task (Park, Taylor, Stuart, & Raskin, 2014). Human responses were
collected via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk micro crowdsourcing application. This
study showed an advantage on the part of machines to outperform untrained users
on the phishing detection task.
Park and Taylor also took Park’s earlier work and developed it into more
detail (Park & Taylor, 2015). This later research focused on the various ways in
which syntactic phrase structures might generate machine learning features.
Syntactic connections between the set of action verbs, and their subjects and
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objects. This is another small step away from NLP surface features into meaningful,
semantic features.

2.4.2.3. Semantic Features

Semantics is a less frequently examined topic in phishing research. Vector
semantics (Salton, Wong, & Yang, 1975) appears most often when studying
ML-based semantic NLP. Both the previously mentioned
phishGILLNET (Ramathan & Wechsler, 2012) project and other work such as that
of L’Huillier, Hevia, Weber, and Ros (2010) utilizes latent semantic analysis as the
primary ML tool.
But this kind of semantics is fundamentally different from knowledge-base
forms of semantics. Latent semantic analysis and latent Direchlet allocation both
take input texts and cluster the individual words according to what their latent
meaning or semantics. The space in which these word clusters exist expresses the
hidden or latent semantics. But discovering what exactly is the specific meaning
behind these clusters still remains a task for humans.
The WordNet project out of Princeton University offers another approach to
semantics. WordNet is just as its name suggests; a network of words (Princeton
University, 2010). The network is made up by describing how the words are
interrelated via hypernyms, hyponyms, synonyms, and other lexical features. These
connections are something of a projection of the underlying semantics but they are
still lexical and language-specific. For instance, Arabic has single words that
distinguish between maternal and paternal aunts and uncle. English makes no such
distinction so the hypernymic/hyponymic relations between the words in the two
languages would necessarily differ.
Meaning-based machine learning (MBML) is a research program outlined by
Falk and Stuart to improve traditional machine learning by infusing it with actual,
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human meaning (Falk & Stuart, 2016). The hypothesis behind MBML is that only
by providing semantically meaningful data as input to a ML system will the output
be meaningful. This stands in direct contrast to vectors in semantic space or
networks of lexemes.

2.5 Summary
This chapter identified the existing literature that is relevant to the
dissertation. There are several different, related fields at work in this research.
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Table 2.2
A list of anti-phishing academic research projects.
Solution

Source

Media

Classifier(s)

AntiPhish

2005

“Approximate string”

2014

CANTINA

2007

Web page Custom heuristic

CANTINA+

2011

Web page SVM, logistic regression,

Web page Custom heuristic
URL

Custom heuristic

Bayesian

network,

J48,

random forest, AdaBoost
“Distributed software agents”

2013

Web page Multi-agent system

“Experimental comparison”

2000

“Genetic algorithm”

2010

Web page Genetic algorithms

GoldPhish

2010

Web page Custom heuristic

LinkGuard

2006

URL

Custom heuristic

PILFER

2007

Email

SVM, rule-based, decision

Email

Naive Bayes

tree, Bayesian
PhishAri

2012

Twitter

Naive Bayes, decision trees,
random forest

PhishCatch

2009

Email

Custom heuristic

phishGILLNET

2012

Email

Probabilistic
semantic

latent
analysis,

AdaBoost
PhishNet

2010

URL

Phishpin

2009

Web page Custom heuristic

PhishTackle

2014

Web page SVM, customer heuristic

Phishwish

2009

PhishZoo

2011

Web page Custom heuristic

SpoofGuard

2004

Web page Custom heuristic

Web Wallet

2006

Web page Custom heuristic

Email

Custom heuristic

Custom heuristic
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Figure 2.2. Viewing the citations of the references from Table 2.2 as a
network.

Half of the foundation of this dissertation is information security. In the last
ten to twenty years there were written several foundational texts on the topic.
Newer, more specific topics have arisen since then such as complex web exploit kits.
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If information security is half the foundation of this dissertation then
knowledge representation is the other half. Knowledge representation concerns itself
with the representation, storage, and retrieval of information stored in forms similar
to how humans represent knowledge to themselves. These theories of knowledge
representation play a key role in modern technologies such as natural language
processing and the Semantic Web.
Machine learning is a suite of tools and techniques designed to find patterns
in large amounts of data. ML originally grew out of the wider field of artificial
intelligence. There are several different ways to compare ML techniques such as
whether or not the input data is tagged or the ways the algorithm represent the
pattern internally. ML plays a key role in this dissertation by providing the tools for
comparing differing sets of data, and understanding how ML works is the first step
towards meeting that goal.
The final field addressed by the literature review is that of phishing
detection. Phishing attacks are not new, and they are a fairly well-studied field by
this point. There exists research covering all the different varieties of phishing
attacks, how to train users to recognize them, and the impacts that successful
attacks have on the economy. Because this dissertation specifically focuses on using
ML for identifying phishing emails it is useful to know the prior research in this area
and what approaches were already tried.
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CHAPTER 3. THEORY
In theory, there is no difference
between theory and practice. But
in practice, there is.
Yogi Berra

This chapter describes the relevant theories that underpin the experiments to
follow. These theories are developed into formalisms used to transform input text
into meaningful output structures. For an OST-based system the end output of
processing is known as a text meaning representation (TMR). The TMR is a graph
structure that represents the totality of information presented in the input corpus.
A gold standard TMR would be one that is as close as possible to the
understanding that a speaker would take away from reading it.
Ontological Semantics Technology (OST) is a frame-based system for
processing natural language text (Taylor, 2010). OST recognizes the ambiguity
inherent in natural language and doesn’t constrain itself to being processable by
first-order logic the way that pure ontology systems like the Semantic Web
does (Berners-Lee, Hendler, & Lassila, 2001). Recanati makes a parallel distinction
with “linguistic semantics” and “real semantics” where the former is necessary for
handling the difficulties of natural language before passing the results on to the
latter (Recanati, 2006). Work in the form of the OntoSem2OWL project looks to
build a one-way bridge from the kind of ontology practice by OST and the kind of
ontology practiced by the Semantic Web (Java et al., 2007).
One of the goals of OST is to use microtheories as a way to build its
knowledge representation and processing capabilities out to meet the need of
natural language. While the descriptions of linguistic phenomena in this paper do
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not meet the criteria of a formal microtheory they do provide a starting point for
reasoning and describing aspects of the natural world.

3.1 Text Meaning Representation
The TMR represents the totality of knowledge available in a text. The facts,
instantiated from abstract concepts, connect to one another via their slots.
In OntoSem, a RELATION is a subclass of PROPERTY where both domain
and range are concepts. Properties with non-concept ranges would fall under the
ATTRIBUTE property. Another feature of a RELATION that distinguishes it from
an ATTRIBUTE is the ability for it to have its own INVERSE property. INVERSE
is itself a type of RELATION. When a RELATION is connected to another
RELATION via the INVERSE property then the domain of the first RELATION
becomes the range of the second, and the range of the first RELATION becomes the
domain of the second. This essentially creates a bidirectional link between the
domain and range facts.
The sentence in Example 1 serves as a way of illustrating the high-level
stages that text goes through in order to become a TMR.
(1) “Bob put down the book that he was reading.”
Through a series of processing steps the resulting S-expression might look
something as follows in Figure 3.1:
Figure 3.1 shows how concepts gleaned from the example form a nested
structure. The same structure might also be represented as a tree as shown in
Figure 3.3. This tree is an intermediate step in the formation of a TMR. But what
the tree shows, that the TMR lacks, is the structure with which the information was
originally presented in the text. In many ways this concept tree parallels syntax
trees. For comparison purposes, Figure 3.1 shows one possible interpretation of a
phrase structure.
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(PUT−DOWN−22
(AGENT (VALUE (HUMAN−41)))
(THEME (VALUE (BOOK−3
(PRINTS−CONTENT (VALUE (BOOK−CONTENT−7)))
(THEME−OF (VALUE (READ−189
(AGENT (VALUE (HUMAN−41)))
)))
)))
)

Figure 3.1. An intermediate TMR represented as an S-expression.

TP
VP

PN
Bob

PrtP

V
put

CP

Prt
down

C0

DP
D

N

TP

C

T0

the book that PRN
he

T

V

was reading

Figure 3.2. Phrase structure representation of Example 1.
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PUT-DOWN-22
AGENT

THEME

BOOK-3

HUMAN-41
PRINTS-CONTENT

BOOK-CONTENT-7

THEME-OF

READ-189
AGENT

HUMAN-41

Figure 3.3. The tree structure of Figure 3.1.

There is a key piece of information about the ontology that is necessary to
know before the Figure 3.3 concept tree makes sense. While the example sentence
contains a single word, “book”, this could have two possible renderings according to
the ontology (Guarino & Welty, 2002b). First, there is the physical, printed book
in which strings of characters are written in ink on paper and bound together.
Second, there is the content being presented in the book which instead of being
physical is treated as a mental object, intangible and invisible. These two different
concepts are connected by a relation that explains how the mental book content is
attached to the physical book. What happens in the example is that both concepts
are invoked in one utterance. In the main clause, “Bob put down the book”, the
book in question is physical because it is the THEME of a physical event,
PUT-DOWN. But in the relative clause, “the book that he was reading”, the
meaning is now understood to be the mental BOOK-CONTENT object because it
is the THEME of the mental event, READ. Therefore, the resulting concept tree
must instantiate both of these two concepts and connect them together with the
aforementioned PRINTS-CONTENT relation.
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This concept tree only shows one direction of the relations between concepts.
The TMR is a graph that includes all explicit information like that presented in the
concept tree, and the implicit information contained in the INVERSE relations. For
instance, the concept tree in Figure 3.3 states that BOOK-3 is connected to
BOOK-CONTENT-7 via the PRINTS-CONTENT relation. But it is also true, yet
not explicitly stated, that BOOK-CONTENT-7 is also connected to BOOK-3 via
the INVERSE relation of PRINTS-CONTENT, IN-PRINTED-CONTENT.
AGENT-OF

PUT-

AGENT

HUMAN-41

DOWN-22
AGENT-OF
AGENT

READ-189

THEME

THEME-OF

THEME
THEME-OF
IN-PRINTED-

BOOK-

CONTENT

BOOK-3

CONTENT-7
PRINTS-CONTENT

Figure 3.4. The complete TMR derived from the intermediate TMR in
Figure 3.3.

3.2 Modeling Linguistic Phenomena
There exist several linguistic phenomena that warrant consideration when
generating a TMR. The most important phenomena are structural in nature.
Surface phenomena such as orthography and morphology aren’t addressed in this
paper.
Any automated solution for generating TMRs should address each of these
phenomena. This paper doesn’t devote space to discussing what such a solution
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might look like. So no assumptions are made about how the interactions between
phenomena might translate into algorithmic implementations.

3.2.1 Syntax
Syntax is arguable the most difficult topic to cover. This is due in part to the
gray area called the syntax-semantics interface; it is not clear where the area defined
by syntax ends and the area defines by semantics begins, and vice versa.
The approach described in this paper looks at dependency syntax. This
aligns well with the existing SYN-STRUC formalism (Nirenburg & Raskin, 2004).
Note that this doesn’t necessarily the dependency approach empirically better. It is
just easier to immediately use as a SYN-STRUC doesn’t describe the constituency
need for a universal grammar approach.

3.2.1.1. Plurality

Plurality is a deceptively simple syntactic phenomenon. One concept
instantiates into one fact. But how does a group of two instances of the same
concept get represented?
The original OntoSem work provides a formalism useful in instantiating
plural concepts. The SET structure offers a variety of parameters that combined
can represent the variety of plural forms found in languages around the
world (Nirenburg & Raskin, 2004).
(2) “A car.”
A noun with a numeral is the simplest case of English plural. The SET’s
TYPE parameter would be assigned the noun’s CONCEPT. In this situation “car”
has a SEM-STRUC with the AUTOMOBILE concept. The CARDINALITY
parameter is assigned the numeric value of the numeral, which is three. And finally
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(AUTOMOBILE−98)

Figure 3.5. A trivially simple intermediate TMR with a single instantiated
concept.

the COMPLETE parameter is assigned the TRUE value because Example 3 is
describing a finite set of cars.
(3) “Three cars.”

(SET−117
(TYPE (AUTOMOBILE) )
(CARDINALITY ( 3 ) )
(COMPLETE (TRUE) )
)

Figure 3.6. A set that describes three cars instantiated at once.

(4) “Cars.”

3.2.1.2. Case Roles

Case roles highlight one of the problems involved in defining the
syntax-semantics interface. Some syntactic approaches utilize features to mark
constraints on the objects of a verb. But these features only hint at the underlying
semantics. Below are the formally recognized case roles used by OST
systems (Nirenburg & Raskin, 2004):
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Table 3.1
The list of case roles as used by Ontological Semantics.
Case Role

Definition

AGENT

Entity responsible for an action.

BENEFICIARY

Entity deriving benefit from an action.

DESTINATION

Ending point of an action.

INSTRUMENT

Object used to carry out an action.

LOCATION

Place where an action occurs.

MANNER

Style in which an action is done.

PATH

Route taken during an action.

PATIENT

Entity affected by an action.

SOURCE

Starting point of an action.

THEME

Entity manipulated by an action.

42

(SET−203
(TYPE (AUTOMOBILE) )
(CARDINALITY ( >1))
(COMPLETE (FALSE) )
)

Figure 3.7. A set describing one or more car instances.

Work from Dik defines a hierarchy of semantic roles available to syntactic
subjects. By default the subject of a sentence fills the AGENT slot of an event as
shown in Figure 3.8:
(5) “Bob sent the spam.”

(SEND−11
(AGENT (VALUE (HUMAN−73)))
(THEME (VALUE
(SPAM−EMAIL−MESSAGE−2)))
)

Figure 3.8. An intermediate TMR demonstrating a subject with agency
filling an AGENT role.

Case roles don’t necessarily map one-to-one with their syntactic positions. It
is possible that the subject of a sentence may actually be the instrument. This can
be determined by examining whether or not the subject has the necessary agency to
carry out the action in question.
(6) “The malware sent the spam.”
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(SEND−12
(AGENT (VALUE (MALWARE−793)))
(THEME (VALUE
(SPAM−EMAIL−MESSAGE−3)))
)

Figure 3.9.

An intermediate TMR demonstrating a subject without

agency filling an INSTRUMENT role.

3.2.1.3. Anaphora and Ellipsis

Anaphora is a deceptive syntactic phenomenon. Understanding anaphora
requires resolving pro-form words to the entities they reference. There can be
reflexive pronouns serving as direct objects that refer back in the sentence to the
subject. Or the subject might be a dummy pronoun whose only purpose is to make
the sentence syntactically correct: “It is hot out today.”
Along with anaphora comes the phenomenon of ellipsis (McShane & Babkin,
2015). Ellipsis differs from anaphora in that ellipsis is the eliding, or deletion, of
words or entire phrases of text. This is often seen in question answering. “Did you
walk the dog today?” “I did [walk the dog today].”
Without proper handling of ellipsis the intermediate TMR of the response
might look as follows:
This is wrong for a few reasons. First and foremost, it omits both the object
of the sentence (“the dog”) and the adverb that modifies when the event occurred
(“today”). Secondly, instantiating the verb “did” as EVENT creates an overly
vague TMR. We know from the preceding utterance in the discourse that “did”
refers to the act of walking. A better intermediate TMR, one in which the available
information is used to resolve the ellipsis would look like:
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(EVENT−99
(AGENT (VALUE (HUMAN−1023)))
)

Figure 3.10. How the phrase, “I did,” might look without resolving the
ellipsis.

(WALK−PET−4
(AGENT (VALUE (HUMAN−1023)))
(PATIENT (VALUE (DOG−74)))
(TIME ( ‘ ‘2015 −08 −15 ’ ’))
)

Figure 3.11. The phrase, “I did,” with the ellipsis properly resolved.

3.2.2 Semantics
The core methodology described in this dissertation derives from the work
into ontological semantics (OntoSem) by Nirenburg and Raskin (2004). OntoSem
uses a frame-based ontology with inheritance rules for structuring its knowledge.
The ontology itself is language-independent. But each language gets its own lexicon
whose lexeme entries map back to and optionally extend the concepts specified in
the ontology.
One of the earliest OntoSem projects was the Mikrokosmos project at New
Mexico State University (Onyshkevich & Nirenburg, 1995). Mikrokosmos was
designed to support machine translation between English and Spanish. While not
without its faults (Guarino & Welty, 2002a), Mikrokosmos established several key
aspects that would feature prominently in later OntoSem work.
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The latest iteration of OntoSem is known as Ontological Semantics
Technology or OST (Taylor, 2010). OST continues on with the OntoSem program
and looks to improve on what components and theories were deemed lacking in the
prior versions.
Semantics is at the heart of this paper. Semantic information, in comparison
to pragmatics, is information that may be determined in absence of any kind of
context.
At the core of OST’s knowledge representation is the ontology. Concepts are
organized in a hierarchical fashion with child concepts inheriting properties from
their parent concept (Touretzky, 1986). These seemingly simple IS-A relations hide
potentially complex situations (Brachman, 1983).

3.2.2.1. Modality

Linguistic modality is similar to the modality found in first-order logic
systems in that it modifies what would otherwise be a standalone expression. The
sentence, “We eat Indian food,” is a simple declaration. Add in the modal auxiliary
verb “could” and the meaning changes to a statement of possibility, “We could eat
Indian food.”
OST defines a system of modalities consisting of seven different modal
qualifiers, some of which are familiar to first-order logic systems as described in
Table 3.2.

ANIMATE-

EVENT

ANIMAL PLANT ARTIFACT NATURAL-OBJECT

ATTRIBUTE

MERONYMICRELATION

MERONYMICRELATION

SCALARATTRIBUTE

SCALARATTRIBUTE

CONTINUOUS- CONTINUOUS-

STRING-

LITERAL-

DEFINITION

ANNOTATION ATTRIBUTE

ATTRIBUTE

RELATIVE-

ATTRIBUTE

SCALAR-

RELATION

ABSOLUTE-

SCALAR-

DISCRETE-

MERONYMIC-

CONTINUOUS-

SCALARATTRIBUTE

RELATION

PROPERTY

SEMANTIC-

SEGMENTAL- STRUCTURAL-

RELATION

IS-A SUBCLASSES INVERSE

RELATION

ONTOLOGYTAXONOMIC-

EVENT

OBJECT

EVENT

INANIMATE-

EVENT

PHYSICAL- SOCIAL- MENTAL-

Figure 3.12. An example upper ontology.

ROLE
OBJECT

OBJECT

OBJECT

ORGANIZATION SOCIAL-

PHYSICAL-

SOCIAL-

OBJECT

MENTAL-

OBJECT

ALL
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Table 3.2
The list of modalities as used by Ontological Semantics.
Modality

Definition

Epistemic

Belief about the factualness.

Deontic

Moral obligation and permission.

Volitive

Degree of desirability.

Potential

Ability to perform the action.

Epiteuctic

Resulting success.

Evaluative

Attitudes expressed.

Saliency

Importance of the meaning.

There exist several problems with the current OST modalities not the least
of which is a formally blessed way of expressing negation. Negation could be
expressed as an epistemic modality with a value of 0.0. It seems more likely that
negation is a unary boolean modifier and not a continuously valued modal qualifier.
Another problem is that the deontic qualifier collapses and oversimplifies a
distinction between obligation and permission.

3.2.2.2. Social Roles

Social roles are an interesting semantic phenomenon. A concept can play a
social role without subclassing a new concept (Masolo et al., 2004). They are
completely different from the previously discussed case roles.
Take a student as an example. First and foremost, a student is a HUMAN
concept. If there were a separate STUDENT concept that inherited from HUMAN
then there would be the situation that when the human-as-a-student were referred
to it might be as the STUDENT-1 while when the very same individual were spoken
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of on his/her own it would be as the HUMAN-2 concept. The fact that there are
two separate and distinct facts suggest two distinct entities when this is directly
contrary to the information being conveyed.
(7) “The president is sworn into office.”

(SWEAR−IN−332
(AGENT (VALUE (PRESIDENT−4)))
(THEME (VALUE (POLITICAL−OFFICE−97)))
)

Figure 3.13. Instantiating a role instead of the individual playing the role.

(SWEAR−IN−332
(AGENT (VALUE (HUMAN−59
(PLAYS−ROLE (VALUE (PRESIDENT−4)))
)))
(THEME (VALUE (POLITICAL−OFFICE−97)))
)

Figure 3.14. Instantiating a role instead of the individual playing the role.

Instead, the student should be anchored with a HUMAN concept and use a
PLAYS-ROLE slot to connect it to a STUDENT concept. In the preceding
example, STUDENT inherited from HUMAN. But the improved way to handle it
would be for the STUDENT concept to inherit from a dedicated SOCIAL-ROLE
concept that in turn is a subclass of SOCIAL-OBJECT (as opposed to the
PHYSICAL-OBJECT that is a HUMAN).
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3.2.2.3. Complex Events

Complex events are given a brief treatment in the Nirenburg and Raskin
text (Nirenburg & Raskin, 2004). A complex event has a mereological relationship
with one or more other events that form parts of the larger complex
event (Fellbaum, 2002).
McDonough establishes some criteria for what distinguishes a complex event
from a simple, or atomic event (C. J. McDonough, 2000, p.32). An event should be
considered as a complex event if its frame specifies:
1. Sub-events or a mereonymic nature (as opposed to a taxonomic subclass).
2. Preconditions that must occur before the given event would happen.
3. Postconditions or results that come from the event’s completion.
Taking a step is one example of a complex event. There are three distinct
sub-events that make up a STEP event: 1) the foot is raised, 2) the foot is
repositioned, and 3) the foot is then set down. It should be noted that it is
necessary for it to be the same foot throughout all three sub-events otherwise the
STEP concept does not make sense. Without this additional constraint it would be
perfectly valid for the STEP complex event to involve three different feet; one each
for each sub-event.
Events are at the core of OST. When something happens, or an action is
performed, it is an event. Many events are atomic, which is to say that they are
self-contained and don’t require describing any other component events. Contrast
these simple, atomic events with complex events, whose definition requires other
events exist in order to make sense of the larger, complex event. These part events
may themselves be other complex events.
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3.2.2.4. Scripts

The idea of scripts grew out of cognitive psychology research aimed at
bridging the gap with artificial intelligence (Schank & Abelson, 1977). Continued
development of scripts was done by Schank and Leake under the title of memory
organization packets Schank (1999).
Scripts are defined in comparison to events. Whereas an event is
self-contained and atomic, a script may contain several interacting components and
multiple different pathways to completion. Another distinction is that an event can
stand in isolation, but a script is only understood after studying multiple
occurrences of a phenomenon.
As an example, compare the event SHINE with the script ATTEND-PLAY.
SHINE is the physical emission of light. It’s instrument could be a LIGHT-BULB or
a CANDLE or even a CHEM-LIGHT. The external product is LIGHT.
The script for ATTEND-PLAY is fraught with more complications than the
SHINE event. For ATTEND-PLAY there may be the necessary precondition of
PURCHASE-TICKET. Only then can the HUMAN with the TICKET
corresponding to the DRAMATIC-PLAY in question enter the
PERFORMANCE-VENUE, find the SEAT assigned to them by the TICKET, SIT,
and then WATCH with rapt attention. Additional paths arise if we consider that
the play may be a free production and not require a ticket. Or the seating is general
admission so an assigned seat doesn’t exist. Somehow there must be a logical path
through the ATTEND-PLAY script that invokes one or more of these components
events.
Scripts are related to complex events, but differ in significant ways. While all
scripts are complex events, not all complex events are scripts. Scripts differ from
complex events in two important ways:
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1. A script is developed from repeated observations of common sequences of
events as they happen in the real world. Complex events can be described and
understood in a vacuum devoid of the context needed by scripts.
2. The component events of a script are causally connected. One component
event happens that flows into the next and so on. Complex events, on the
other hands, require all their component events to happen.
As an example of a complex event, take respiration, the process by which
many living objects obtain the oxygen they require in order to live. Respiration is a
complex event. Its part events are inhale, and exhale. Both inhalation and
exhalation must happen and must happen only in the specified order for the
complex respiration event to have occurred.
For a script example consider teaching. A treatment of the teach event is
found in Nirenburg and Raskin (2004). But according to the two differences
between complex events and scripts described above, teach would more accurately
be described as a script. The reason is because while teach might include
instruction on the part of a teacher and learning on the part of a student only the
former is required for the teach event to occur. Teaching might result in learning, so
the learn event follows causally from instruct, but learning is in reality only a
condition for success of teaching. If no learning occurs then the teaching still
occurred, but it was largely a failure.
Schank and Abelson (1977) offer the first formal treatment of both scripts
and plans. Plans can be treated as a more general case of scripts, but won’t play a
part in this dissertation. The goal of Schank and Abelson (1977) was to bridge
cognitive psychological research with that of computer science. This theory section
will expand to include a description of how scripts might fit into an OST system
along with a formalism useful for describing any scripts encountered in the
methodology chapter.
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So how do atomic events, complex event, and scripts differ? As a rule of
thumb, an atomic event can always be a complex event (C. McDonough, 2000). It
is always possible to describe an event in more detail. For instance, describing
walking as a sequence of steps using alternating feet. And steps being a sequence of
raising, moving, and then lowering the same foot. This is a situation where the level
of granularity in describing events is determined by the needs of the application. A
medical application might require an in-depth description of respiration while a
banking application might not.
The real question then is: how does a complex event differ from a script?
Recall that scripts are informed by repeated observations of common sequences of
events. One question an acquirer must ask themselves is: which parts of this
sequence might be abstracted away, and which parts are perhaps culture or
situation-specific? In many ways a script as defined by Schank and Abelson is more
pragmatic than purely semantic because it encodes details that aren’t universally
necessary or relevant. Think back to the teaching script example. Americans raised
in the 1950s might say that teaching involves students sitting at individual desks
with a teacher standing in front of a blackboard, lecturing them on a topic. This
teaching script stands in stark contrast to some more modern trends in teaching
espoused by teaching philosophies such as Montessori, Aurora, and other
“constructivist” schools.
There are then two basic tests for determining if an action is a complex event
or a script:
1. There are two or more paths that might be followed through the sequence of
events to reach an outcome that closes the script.
2. There are aspects of the script that are culture-specific or that otherwise don’t
generalize to all situations (either geographically or temporally).
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3.2.2.5. Metonymy

Metonymous speech is a common phenomenon where one proper noun
substitutes for another. Places can substitute for people who work there such as
when news reporting cite the executive mansion in place of the executive staff. “The
White House said today...” (Nirenburg & Raskin, 2004) The BUILDING concept
does not have the necessary agency to fill the AGENT slot of the SPEAK event.
The result as shown in Figure 3.15 is nesting a BUILDING instance beneath the
implied HUMAN instance, connecting the two by way of a WORKS-IN relation.
(SPEAK−71
(AGENT (VALUE (HUMAN−202
(WORKS−IN (VALUE (BUILDING−9)))
)))
(THEME (VALUE ( . . . ) ) )
)

Figure 3.15. Building standing in place of a worker.

Or an individual can stand in for their work. “I was reading Palahniuk
earlier...” The second HUMAN, Palahniuk, cannot fill the THEME slot of the
READ event. The resulting TMR shown in Figure 3.16 inverts the structure used in
Figure 3.15.
George Lakoff writes extensively on the topic of metonymy as it relates to
the wider field of metaphor (Lakoff, 1987). His list of English metonymous
relationships remains a staple and a solid foundation for beginning new knowledge
representation work:
1. PRODUCER standing in for PRODUCT - Nothing sounds as lovely as a
Stradivarius.
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(READ−23
(AGENT (VALUE (HUMAN−310)))
(THEME (VALUE (BOOK−47
(AUTHORED−BY (VALUE (HUMAN−311)))
)))
)

Figure 3.16. Author standing in place of their work.

2. OBJECT standing in for its USER - That taxi totally ignored me.
3. CONTROLLER standing in for something that is CONTROLLED - The pilot
nearly crashed.
4. INSTITUTION standing in for the responsible PEOPLE - Mossack Fonseca
helped a lot of people conceal their wealth.
5. PLACE standing in for the INSTITUTION - Number 10 Downing Street
released a statement today.
6. PLACE standing in for the EVENT - There should never be another
Hiroshima.

3.2.2.6. Mereology

Mereology is the study of parts and their relations to whole objects. For
instance, a wheel can stand on its own as a distinct concept, but car requires the
wheel part in order to be fully realized and understood. Having a proper
mereological structure for OST is necessary to accurately describe both objects and
events. It should be noted that this dissertation is more concerned with the latter.
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One avenue of mereology research distinguishes between structural and
segmental types of mereology (Pribbenow, 2002). Structural mereology looks at
how objects interconnect as parts in a larger structure. Contract that with
segmental mereology that aims to describe how a single, whole object might be
segmented up into parts as a function of natural language discourse.

3.3 Summary
The theory chapter of this dissertation outlines the linguistic, philosophical,
mathematical, and computational theories necessary to turn a piece of raw,
unstructured text into its TMR form.
This chapter began by describing exactly what a TMR is. It then proposed a
structure called an intermediate TMR that exists between the syntactic phrase
structure of a text and the full, formal TMR. This intermediate TMR is critical to
the subsequent machine learning experiments.
Finally, the chapter addressed a series of linguistic phenomena that
potentially affect how a TMR represents the meaning of a text. The list of linguistic
phenomena included here is by no means comprehensive, and bears some bias
towards the English language.
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CHAPTER 4. FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY
Sometimes science is more art than
science. A lot of people don’t get
that.
Rick Sanchez
Rick and Morty

The methodology is proposed and a limited set of samples is examined. 10
samples each from known good and phishing emails were identified and used as
examples. All of these samples included at least one attachment that was a PDF
document. In the case of the phishing emails these attachments were malicious and
were handled in such a way as to avoid accidental infection of the computers used to
conduct the research.
Ten samples of known good emails were taken from the personal email
accounts of the author. Finding good email samples for analysis isn’t difficult in and
of itself. Corpora such as Spam Assassin and the 2005 TREC provide
samples (Cormack & Lynam, 2005). The difficulty comes in first finding sample
emails with their attachments included. More difficult was finding sample emails
whose attachments were specifically PDF documents. The Enron corpus was
another possibility (Cohen, 2015). But later changes to the published Enron corpus
include stripping out email attachments, which was a critical requirement for the
research question.
Finding phishing email corpora is also a complicated task. The APWG
willingly shares gigabytes of data with researchers who inquire. But the data require
filtering to remove text artifacts created when an APWG member forwards the
suspected phishing email to the group. After filtering there is still the task of parsing
the emails and identifying which, if any, include PDF documents as attachments.
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Table 4.1
Available email corpora.
Corpus

Type

Attachments

Size

Cost

APWG

Phish

Yes

˜94,000/mo.

Free

Avocado

Ham

Yes

614,461

$1600

Clinton Emails

Ham

No

30,322

Free

ELRA-WC347

Phish

Unknown

210

Unknown

Enron

Ham

No

˜500,000

Free

SpamAssassin

Ham/Spam

Yes

6047

Free

TREC 2007

Ham/Spam

Yes

75,419

Free

W3C

Ham

Yes

174,311

Free

Wolverhampton

Spam

No

673

Free

The MIME::Parser module for Perl offers a simple and effective library for parsing
emails while simultaneously extracting their attachments (Eryq & Skoll, 2015).
Once all of this processing is complete, finding an email with a PDF attachment is
as simple as searching the corpus directory structure for files with a .pdf extension.
Alternatively, anti-virus tools like ClamAV can scan the directory structure and
identify malicious files, identifying phishing emails with previously seen malware
samples to which the anti-virus tool possesses a known signature (Kojm, 2013).

4.1 Sample Selection
The first step in analyzing emails is the collection of one or more email
corpora. To train a binary classifier there must be two corpora; a corpus of known
good emails and a corpus of phishing attack emails. Table 4.1 describes a number of
email corpora found during the initial stages of research.
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The Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) is an information security
industry group working to raise awareness and find solutions to phishing
attacks (Anti-Phishing Working Group, 2015). They have a steady stream of
sample emails that are forwarded to them by individual partners. The emails are
available for download free of charge after registering an account. Emails are
grouped by the month in which they were submitted with an average of over ninety
thousand (90,000) emails per month.
Avocado is the collected emails of an information technology company that
went out of business (Oard, Webber, Kirsch, & Golitsynskiy, 2015). The corpus is
available through the Linguistic Data Consortium (LDC) for a fee of $1600 if you
are not a LDC member. Multiple inquiries around the Purdue West Lafayette
campus failed to uncover anyone with an LDC membership that might be able to
acquire the emails free of charge.
The ELRA-WC347 corpus proved difficult to access. ELRA-WC347 is
advertised by the European Language Resources Association (ELRA). This
particular corpus collects 210 phishing emails from years 2004 and 2005. But the
corpus is not freely downloadable. Requests to ELRA for access went did little to
clear up the way to license or otherwise access the data.
The Enron email corpus is possibly the most well known of all email
corpora (Cohen, 2015). Following in the wake of a tumultuous bankruptcy and
federal criminal proceedings, the Enron corpus collects the corporate email
communications of the energy trading company before its failure. The corpus has
undergone several iterations with filtering for PII.
Hillary Clinton is the focus of an ongoing federal investigation regarding her
use of a personal email server for handling work emails during her tenure as U.S.
Secretary of State (O’Harrow, 2016). Some of these emails were revealed to contain
sensitive, confidential, or classified information. Several unclassified emails were
released in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request (U.S.
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Department of State, 2014). They are available as PDFs on the U.S. State
Department web site but don’t include any attachments.
SpamAssassin is a spam email filtering software system. As a part of their
work, the SpamAssassin team assembled a corpus of ham and spam emails (2004).
The suggested uses of these emails are as training and testing aids, and they can be
downloaded separate from the SpamAssassin software package.
The Text Retrieval Conference (TREC) is a series of conferences devoted to
the testing and measuring of text analytics software. TREC 2007 included a
research problem focusing on correctly identifying spam emails. To that end, the
TREC organizes built a corpus collecting known good emails and spam emails.
Researchers would use this common resource as the means to test and compare their
current state-of-the-art approaches to machine learning.
The W3C corpus included in Table 4.1 was produced by Yejun Wu of the
University of Maryland, College Park (2005). The original source of the emails were
a set of email mailing lists maintained by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C).
Wu’s purpose in cleaning and filtering the mailing lists was their use in the 2005
TREC Enterprise Track (TRECENT) competition. Wu wasn’t the only researcher
to clean and distribute a version of the corpus and other academics have similar
collections also available online.
Students at Wolverhamption University in the United Kingdom entered the
Language Resources and Evaluation Conference (LREC) 2002 (Krishnamurthy &
Orasan, 2002). As a part of their research they collected around fifteen hundred
spam emails, which filtered down to 673 unique emails. This spam email corpus is
freely available online from their Wolverhamption web page.
For the phishing samples it was decided to use the APWG data. The reason
is because the APWG corpus is open-ended, constantly collecting more data from
its partners. Since the sample emails needed to contain PDF documents as
attachments then it made sense to use a source that could be continually revisited
until a sufficient sample size was obtained.
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Forming the known good email sample set was more difficult. Phishing
emails, like spam emails, are unsolicited and sent to a large number of recipients
who are unknown to the sender. The sender can’t then personalize each and every
email. As a result these unsolicited emails have a certain business/impersonal
style (Yus, 2011). Therefore it was deemed necessary to find known good sample
emails that shared this impersonal writing style. One option was bulk emails such
as those sent to mailing lists. A request went out to academics at Purdue for emails
received from mailing lists with a PDF attachment. The responses comprised the
known good corpus for the subsequent research.

4.2 Pre-processing
All emails arrived as individual files. Each file is an RFC 822-encoded email
message (Crocker, 1982). To get just the message body itself these raw emails must
be individually parsed and the separate parts extracted. This process also includes
parsing out any and all attached files.
Several tools and libraries exist for a variety of programming languages to
parse emails. The final decision was to use the MIME::Parser module for the Perl
language (Eryq & Skoll, 2015). Perl was designed and implemented to be a fast
text processing language, which matches well with the text-focused task of
processing emails. Each email file was parsed into its own destination directory,
including any and all attachments.
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Figure 4.1. Histograms of the sample email size combined (upper-left),
known good emails (right) and phishing emails (below).

Figure 4.1 shows the size distribution of the resulting sets of samples. The
subsets of known good and phishing emails are broken out separately for
comparison purposes. All three distributions show similar left skews.
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4.3 Filtering
The APWG source for phishing emails provides far more samples than are
needed. It’s important therefore to filter and winnow down the raw corpus to a
manageable size.
Several problems were encountered when examining the emails provided by
APWG. Recall that APWG collects emails that are forwarded by participants. By
default many email clients prepend forwarded text with some string like “> ” or “| ”
to show that it is being cited by the email author. All this prepended text needed
removing from any sample phishing emails.
Some APWG participants took the opportunity to annotate or editorialize
the samples they were submitting. “Someone should let Microsoft know that their
trademarks are being misused,” suggested one participant. Other participants
weren’t even confident in their own submissions. Another asked, “Could someone
tell me if this is legitimate?” These extraneous interjections, just like the prepended
text inserted by the forwarding operations, must also be removed.
Another complication to the filtering task was that some APWG participants
would forward multiple phishing emails, including them all as attachments in a
single email sent to APWG. This caused problems because once the email file was
run through the MIME::Parser module it wouldn’t be apparent which extracted
attachments corresponded to which phishing emails. Because the original research
question focused on emails with PDF attachments, the inability to correctly connect
attachments to messages meant that any phishing emails submitted in this way had
to be discarded.
It is possible that the same phishing email was submitted by multiple
participants to the APWG archive. Deduplicating, or removing duplicate instances
of phishing emails, produces a set of unique samples. This smaller set of unique
samples is quicker to analyze.
Deduplication was conducted by producing an MD5 hash of the message
body for each email. Hashing just the message bodies removed many of the fields
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such as timestamps and destination email addresses that change with every email,
making the entire email appear different to a cryptographic hash function such as
MD5. But because MD5 is sensitive to minor input changes by design, it still wasn’t
a guaranteed way to provide 100% accurate deduplication. Even a single difference
in whitespace between two email message bodies would cause their hashes to be
different.
One of the original stated requirements of this research was focusing on
emails with PDF documents as attachments. Once the MIME::Parser module did
its work it was a simple matter of searching for files with a “.PDF” extension. The
message bodies corresponding to these PDF files were collected together for final
selection.
This research concerned itself only with English language texts.
Cross-lingual or multi-lingual research is outside of the scope considered. So only
English language emails would be used.
Each of the email message bodies corresponding to a PDF attachment were
examined in turn. The language was noted, and the general theme of the message
recorded. Identifying themes proved useful in the final deduplication phase. For
instance, several emails that survived the prior deduplication step all used the same
“Microsoft Online Sweepstakes” scam. Only one of these emails was needed in order
to avoid over-representing emails of this theme.
During this language identification/deduplication step there was an
interesting ancillary finding. The same theme and message appeared in three
different languages: English, Spanish, and Portuguese. This suggests that there was
an active phisher who took the time to produce the same attack script across
multiple languages in order to reach a broader base. Whether or not the
translations were done by a human or an automated service like Google Translate
remains outside the scope of this research and was not pursued further.
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4.3.1 Malware Detection
The final filtering step was scanning the candidate emails for malicious files.
This step used the ClamAV tool (Kojm, 2013). ClamAV is a freely available, open
source, signature-based anti-virus scanning platform. While ClamAV is usually
deployed on servers to perform automated scanning it can also be run manually
from the command line in the form of the clamscan tool.
None of the known good emails included malicious attachments. But four of
the phishing emails did: 04, 05, 08, and 13. All four of these samples were extremely
terse with none of them being larger than a kilobyte in size. It seems possible that
phishing emails with malicious attachments are deliberately shorter than phishing
emails that must elicit a response from a user. All the malicious attachment
phishing email needs is for the user to open the attachment in question. To do that
they provide a short, emotionally charged message meant to provoke the user into
action quickly without thinking too long about the possible consequences.

4.3.2 Visualization
Word clouds are a useful tool for visualizing a large collection of text. They
collect together the most frequently used words in a corpus with the most frequently
occurring words being sized larger than the less frequently occurring words. This
collection of differently sized words is then arranged both horizontally and vertically
together in an ellipsoid shape and presented to the user. The word cloud offers at a
glance a brief summary of the text statistics.
To visualize the text from the corpus at the end of the filtering stage, two
word clouds were generated; one for the known good email bodies and the other for
the phishing email bodies (Figures 4.3.2 and 4.3.2 respectively).
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Figure 4.2. A word cloud of the one hundred most frequently encountered
terms in the known good email set.

Figure 4.3.2 shows the word cloud for the known good (“ham”) email bodies.
Already there are some interesting indicators appearing. While generic terms such
as “please” and “will” appear largest, there are several academic-sounding terms
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that also appear such as “school,” “graduate” (whether this is a noun, adjective, or
verb sense is unclear at this time), and “purdue.”

Figure 4.3. A word cloud of the one hundred most frequently encountered
terms in the phishing email set.
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Figure 4.3.2 shows the word cloud for the phishing email bodies. There are
some superficial similarities to Figure 4.3.2 such as the terms “please” and “will”
appearing prominently. But the smaller terms differ greatly. The phishing word
cloud has several financial-sounding terms such as “transaction,” “bank,” and
“money.”

4.4 Analysis
Each of the sample emails was analyzed in turn. One TMR was generated
per email. The TMR describes the semantic information present in the email text
without making assumptions about the implied intent. Linguistic phenomena such
as anaphora and deixis are accounted for in the manual analysis. More complex
situations such as those invoking scripts are called out in notes in the analysis
without being explicitly marked in the TMR as such.
The analyses will appear superficially similar to the phrase structures present
in syntactic approaches like universal grammar (Radford, 2009). This is largely
coincident. While there exists evidence for connections between syntax and
semantics it is not explored in this dissertation. Use the sentence, The document is
a PDF, as an example. Figure 4.4 below shows an example tree of what the phrase
structure might look like under universal grammar. Compare and contrast that with
the OST-style semantic representation: (DOCUMENT-117
(HAS-DOCUMENT-TYPE (DOCUMENT-TYPE-43))) where
DOCUMENT-TYPE-43 refers to the PDF standard. Gone are the articles because
their semantic purpose was helping to understand how to instantiate the nouns.
The copular is is also gone because it served a purely syntactic function joining the
two noun clauses together, and serving no real semantic purpose.
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TP
VP

DP
D

N

QP

V

The document is Q

N

a PDF
Figure 4.4. Phrase structure of the sentence, The document is a PDF.

There will not be an entire ontology and lexicon included as a part of the
research. It will be assumed that concepts described are structured in the ontology
according to best acquisition practices. Where doubt exists as to the correct
placement of concepts then a note is included with more information as to the
decision process.
There might be a need for recording the processing steps. Because the
phishing emails might be identifiable by the amount and types of processing
necessary when compared to ham.

4.4.1 Procedure
Ontological semantics distinguishes between an abstract concept and an
instance of that concept seen in a text. An instantiated concept is known as a fact.
The formalism used in ontological semantics is to provide the concept label in all
capital letters. A fact is then labeled the same as the concept it instantiates but
also includes a trailing hyphen followed by an ascending sequence number. As an
example, HUMAN would be the label for the concept abstractly describing any
human being while HUMAN-421 would be the 421st instance of the HUMAN
concept that the system created.
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Certain meta-data from the email, not present in the text of the message
body, is needed in order to make sense of the rest of the email. The following data
are used to instantiate concepts before the body analysis begins:
1. Speaker - The author of the email
2. Listener - The recipient of the email
3. Message - Every sample instantiates one email message and one or more
attachments associated with that message
4. Timestamp - When the email was sent
Senders and recipients, or speakers and listeners, are always assumed to be
two individual unknown to the analyst. This negates the need to cross-reference
email addresses between sample emails and hides personally identifiable information.
Timestamps are crucial for disambiguating utterances such as “today” or
“next week”. Without a specific anchor point for these references they will remain
ambiguous.
The message bodies are processed by first breaking up the whole text into
the individual sentences. Each sentence in turn gets a more in-depth level of
processing. Every sentence generates one or more propositions, a structure anchored
by an instantiated concept with zero or more properties coming off of it.

Table 4.2
Parameters

changed

from

the

default

when

StringToWordVector class.
Parameter
outputWordCounts
stemmer
useStopList

Value
True
LovinsStemmer
True

using

Weka’s
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The first changed parameter is the outputWordCounts. By default this is set
to false , which means that instead of the numeric value of the attribute being the
number of times the word occurs (the count) it is instead either 1.0 if the word is
present or 0.0 if the word is absent.
Stemming is useful in statistical machine learning because it allows the
computer to recognize when the same word happens in multiple inflected senses.
For instance, “stemming,” “stemmed,” and “stem” are respectively the present
participle, past participle, and simple present forms of the verb “to stem.” It would
therefore be a mistake to count each as a separate word with a count of one each.
Instead, the “stem” word should have a count of three.
First of its kind, the Lovins stemmer described an algorithm for stemming
English words (1968). This Lovins stemmer was chosen as the most basic approach
to stemming words available in the Weka tool.
The third and final change to the default parameters was setting the
useStopList to true. Stop words are strings ignored by the parsing algorithm. The
motivation is to cut down on the number of total machine learning features by
ignoring words like function words (prepositions, determiners, etc.), pronouns, and
others. The actual stop list itself is the default option, the Weka−3−6 stop list.

4.5 Machine Learning
Training and testing of ML models was done with the Weka machine learning
framework Hall et al. (2009). Weka is the state of the art tool for machine learning.
It is written in Java and developed at the University of Waikato in New Zealand.
The ML experiments were conducted using three different algorithms. These
three algorithms each represent a different category of ML classifier. Choosing
multiple algorithms from differing categories provides the ability to examine
classifier performance both across data sets and across specific algorithms. Weka
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Table 4.3
Classifying the three different chosen algorithms.
Linear
Generative

Non-linear

Naive Bayes

Discriminative

SVM

J48

provides a variety of tools to include machine learning algorithms, visualization, and
data pipelining for experiments.
Three different algorithms available in Weka were chosen for training and
testing ML models. One algorithm each was chosen from different categories of
algorithm to see how the two different data sets performed against different
algorithms.

4.5.1 Naive Bayes
Naive Bayes is built upon the principles of Bayesian statistics. Recall that
Bayes’ theorem describes how the condition probability of an event based on
previously observed conditions as shown in (4.1).

P (A|B) =

P (B|A)P (A)
P (B)

(4.1)

The naive Bayes approach begins with the assumption of the conditional
independence of prior events (Russell & Norvig, 2003). Naive Bayes works well
despite this assumption, even for very small data sets such as those used in this
research (Salperwyck & Lemaire, 2011).
John and Langley took this research and showed experimentally how it
would function as a classifier (1995). It was this research that motivated the Weka
implementation of the naive Bayes classifier. And because the classifier is
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probabilistic it assigns a continuous probability value to its results, letting a machine
learning researcher examine how likely the algorithm things a certain class is.
X is the class of phishing emails
¬X is the class of non-phishing (known good) emails
wi is a word present in the classifier
D is the document being examined

ln

X
P (X|D)
P (X)
P (wi |X)
= ln
+
ln
>0
P (¬X|D)
P (¬X)
P (wi |¬X)
i

(4.2)

(4.2) shows the math involved in the naive Bayes classifier. So long as the
log-likelihood is greater than zero then the algorithm classifies document D as
belonging to class X, phishing emails.

4.5.2 SVM
Support vector machines (SVM) are a popular choice of ML algorithm for
NLP applications. For a binary classification problem, an SVM aims to draw a line
that can cleanly divide the two classes (Cortes & Vapnik, 1995). Figure 4.5
demonstrates what this might look like in 2D space. All items on one side of the
line belong to the first class of items and the items on the other side of the line
belong to the other class.
The SVM implementation for Weka comes as an external package,
LibSVM (Chang & Lin, 2011). Additional installation and configuration steps are
necessary to get Weka and LibSVM inter-operating. Versions 3.7 and later of Weka
feature package management software to facilitate the SVM installation.
SVM, unlike naive Bayes, is not probabilistic. All classifications done with
SVM are either true or false with no probability assigned to the result.
(4.3) shows the math involved in a soft-margin SVM. Soft-margin SVMs are
an extension of the basic SVM design. The changes allow an SVM to handle data
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Figure 4.5. SVM training with a valid hyperplane (dashed) and an optimal
hyperplane (solid).
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Figure 4.6. Data set where the two classes are not linearly separable.

where the classes are not linearly separable (it is not possible to draw a straight
line/hyperplane to separate two classes such as the case shown in Figure 4.6).
n

1X
max(0, 1 − yi (w
~ · ~xi − b)) + λkwk
~ 2
n i

(4.3)

In (4.3), max(0, 1 − yi (w
~ · ~xi − b)) is the hinge loss function that penalizes ~x
data points that violate the (w,
~ b) hyperplane. Increasing the λ parameter value up
from zero allows more flexibility in terms of violations of the margin.

4.5.3 J48
J48 is a Java-based implementation of the C4.5 algorithm (Quinlan, 1993).
Minor changes were necessary to avoid licensing issues involved with C4.5. In all
other regards the J48 and C4.5 algorithms are identical.
J48 is a decision tree classifier algorithm. The ML features are used to build
a decision tree model used for later testing and application. A benefit of the J48
algorithm over Naive Bayes and SVM is that the nodes in the decision tree contain
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Figure 4.7. An example with four data points for training a machine
learning regression model.

meaningful information as to the decision making process. More about this is
discussed in the following sections.
It is also worth noting that John and Langley used C4.5 decision trees in
their research into naive Bayes classifiers and found that sometimes naive Bayes did
in fact perform better (1995).

4.5.4 Cross Validation
Cross validation is a general ML technique designed to prevent overfitting.
Overfitting occurs in ML applications when a model fits the training data too
closely and then produces poor results when used against general production data.
A more desirable goal then is to train the model in such a way as to have a
generally applicable result at the expense of the testing score.
Figure 4.7 plots four data points. For this example the goal is to train a
regression model whose function generalizes well to production data.
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Figure 4.8. Machine learning regression model using a polynomial of
degree five.
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Figure 4.9. Machine learning linear regression model.

A polynomial function of degree five as seen in Figure 4.8 fits the data
exactly. Accuracy is one hundred percent. This would seen to be an ideal solution
according to the training data. However, the polynomial regression model is
actually overfitting the training data. The problem is not apparent at this point.
The simpler linear regression shown in Figure 4.9 doesn’t appear to fit the
training data nearly as well as the polynomial in Figure 4.8. Accuracy is not one
hundred percent and the function doesn’t pass through any single data point.
Technically the linear regression is underfitting the training data.
The problem of overfitting becomes apparent when taking a model trained
on one set of data and applying it to novel data. Figure 4.10 shows the same
polynomial regression model from Figure 4.8. None of the production data points
are falling exactly on the line. But the one hundred percent accuracy seen in
training would lead us to believe that this was a perfect model. Overfitting the data
caused this model to not generalize well.
The linear regression model initially seen in Figure 4.9 is now applied to the
same novel production data as Figure 4.10. Even though the training model didn’t
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Figure 4.10. Machine learning polynomial regression model applied to
production data.
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Machine learning linear regression model applied to

production data.
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produce a perfect accuracy score it does appear to fit the production data roughly
as well as it did the training data.
One approach to cross validation is called K-fold cross validation. In K-fold
cross validation a parameter value is chosen, K, and the training data is evenly
divided into K groups, or “folds.” For each of the K rounds a different fold is help
back for testing purposes while the other K-1 folds are used for training.
Table 4.4 shows how K-fold cross validation works when K=3. In this
example, the grayed fold is the data fold used for testing in that round while the
white folds are used for training.

Table 4.4
Illustrating K-fold cross validation training and testing with K=3.
K-Fold Cross Validation Train and Test
First Round

1

2

3

Second Round

1

2

3

Third Round

1

2

3

For the experiments in this dissertation the parameter K was set to four.
With twenty-eight samples in each of the two classes this meant that they could be
divided evenly into folds of seven samples each.

4.6 Testing Hypotheses
After the machine learning classifiers are trained then the next task is to
evaluate their performance. The unigram models serve as the baseline measure.
They represent what is currently known to work for NLP solutions. The TMR
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models are the semantics-based experiments. Since there were three algorithms used
to train both the unigram baseline and the TMR experimental models then there
will also be three statistical hypotheses tested.
The statistical hypothesis test used for all three algorithms is the comparison
of sample means where the sample means are the F1 scores for each model. The F1
score is used because it combines together both precision and recall into a single
metric. These statistical tests determine, with a specified level of confidence,
whether or not the results are meaningfully different.

81
4.7 Summary

ham emails

phish emails

manual

TextDirectoryLoader

analysis

StringToWordVector

TMR parser

unigram ARFF

TMR ARFF

WEKA

results

Figure 4.12. Data flow diagram of the proposed methodology.

The methodology of this chapter begins with the collection of email samples
for the research process. It is important to note why certain types of emails were
chosen or excluded, and the overall number of samples chosen. These emails
underwent multiple filtering and processing steps before being passed on to later
stages of the methodology.
The core research question in this dissertation is concerned with whether or
not machine learning algorithms perform better when provided semantic structures
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as opposed to lexical n-grams. With a collection of samples assembled the next step
was to analyze the text comprising the message body of each email and render its
meaningful, semantic representation.
With the semantic data set in hand the third step was to train both baseline
and experimental machine learning classifiers. The baseline classifier was trained on
the uni-gram data set and the experimental classifier was trained on the semantic
data set. Three different algorithms were trained on each of the two data sets to
create a grand total of six different classifiers.
One final step remained, testing the performance of the machine learning
classifiers to determine whether or not they successfully answered the research
question. Statistical hypothesis tests comparing the sample means of the baseline
and experimental data sets for each of the three algorithms.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS
I am turned into a sort of machine
for observing facts and grinding out
conclusions.
Charles Darwin

The goal of this research was the identification of phishing emails using a
knowledge-based approach to natural language processing. Phishing is a general
class of computer attacks in which the attacker attempts to trick the target into
completing the attack. Completing the attack may be as simple as opening an
attached malicious file or opening a link to a malicious web page. Other times the
attack might elicit personally identifiable information from the victim such as
passwords or back accounts. The actual vector for the phishing attack is somewhat
less important. Attackers might send phishing messages via email, social network
posts, or cell phone text messages.
There is some overlap in the definitions of phishing and spamming. The key
difference between the two is that the latter is done to the benefit of the phishing
message sender (the attacker) and the latter is done for marketing purposes on
behalf of some other third party. The spammer gets paid for sending messages in
bulk regardless of the click-through rate (Krebs, 2014) while the phisher only
benefits based on the small number of people who willingly fall victim to the
phishing attack.
Overall this research was a success. It meets the original base goal set forth
to produce a machine learning model that is trained on semantic data and performs
better than random. The secondary goal of the semantic-based model performing
better than its unigram-based counterpart is possibly met but due to sample sizes
there can’t be statistical conclusions drawn from the data.
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5.1 Overall Results
There were six tests conducted in total. They were a cross between the two
different data sets (unigram and TMR) and the three machine learning algorithms
(naive Bayes, SVM, and J48). Table 5.1 below gives the empirical results for all six
of these tests according to six different commonly used metrics: true positive rate
(TP), false positive rate (FP), precision (Prec), recall (Rec), accuracy (F1 ), and the
area under the receiver operating characteristics curve (ROC).

Table 5.1
Results for all six tests scored against six different metrics.
Test

TP

FP

Prec

Rec

F1

ROC

Uni-NB

0.800

0.404

0.673

0.800

0.723

0.741

Uni-SVM

0.754

0.207 0.813

0.754

0.762

0.773

Uni-J48

0.607

0.271

0.607

0.628

0.673

TMR-NB

0.864 0.261 0.776 0.864

0.716

0.813 0.905

TMR-SVM 0.832

0.286

0.771 0.832

0.786 0.773

TMR-J48

0.393

0.701

0.773

0.882

0.882

0.745

Table 5.1 calls out the results in two different ways. First, the top three tests
in each metric are bolded. Second, the best test in each metric is also underlined in
addition to being bolded.
TMR-based models rank higher in terms of the true positive rate and recall
while the unigram model scores better in terms of loser false positive rates and
improved precision. The relation between these measures makes sense after
understanding how the precision measure incorporates the false positive rate while
the recall measure incorporates the false negative rate.
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Table 5.2
Confusion matrices for all six combinations of data sets and algorithms.
Uni-SVM

Classified

Classified

Ham Phish

Ham Phish

Ham

19

9

Phish

11

17

Actual

Actual

Uni-NB

9

Phish

5

23

Classified

Classified

Ham Phish

Ham Phish

Ham

17

11

Phish

6

22

TMR-SVM

Ham

22

6

Phish

8

20

TMR-J48

Classified

Classified

Ham Phish

Ham Phish

Ham

24

4

Phish

6

22

Actual

Actual

19

TMR-NB

Actual

Actual

Uni-J48

Ham

Ham

23

5

Phish

12

16

The experimental results are presented below in two different figures.
Performance is measured in terms of accuracy, which is the F1 score. Accuracy was
chosen as the performance measure due to how it incorporates both precision and
recall.
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0.6
0.4

J48

SVM

Naive Bayes

J48

SVM

0.0

Naive Bayes

0.2

Accuracy (F1 score)

0.8

1.0

Algorithm Performance

Unigram

TMR

Figure 5.1. Accuracy of the machine learning models grouped by training
data set.

Figure 5.1 shows performance of the algorithm experiments. The dashed
horizontal line represents the accuracy of a random binary classifier (0.5 in this
case). Intervals are for a 95% confidence level.
Clearly all the TMR-based models perform better than random. There is
some statistical question about the performance of the unigram-based J48 model
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due to the lower end of the confidence interval dipping below 0.5. But that is not
the primary concern of this research.
It also appears that the TMR-based models outperform the same
unigram-based models. The mean accuracy of every TMR-based model is higher
than any of the unigram-based models. Whether or not we can be confident in this
conclusion is fodder for a statistical hypothesis test. Each of the three data set
pairings shown in Figure 5.1 should be compared with the unigram model being the
baseline and the TMR model being the experimental.

5.2 Statistical Hypothesis Test
The hypothesis, as expressed in (5.1), is that the TMR model (x̄1 ) performs
only as well or worse than the unigram model (x̄2 ). The alternative hypothesis
(5.1b) in this case is that the TMR model does in fact perform better than the
unigram model (Moore, McCabe, & Craig, 2014).

H0 : x̄1 ≤ x̄2

(5.1a)

Ha : x̄1 > x̄2

(5.1b)

The statistical hypothesis test is the comparison of the two sample means.
As an example of how the math works the values for the naive Bayes algorithm are
used as input to the equations. Results for calculations of all three algorithms are
given in Table 5.3.
The first step in the test is the calculation of the test statistic T as shown in
(5.2). The end result is a test statistic value of T = 0.236.
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x̄1 − x̄2
T =q 2
s1
s2
+ N22
N1
0.813 − 0.723
=q
2
0.1022
+ 0.126
56
56
=√

(5.2)

0.09
4.693 · 10−4

= 4.155
Next, the degrees of freedom is calculated as shown in (5.3). The degrees of
freedom value is necessary in later looking up the critical value. For the naive Bayes
algorithm sample means the degrees of freedom ends up rounding to v ≈ 105.

s2

v=

s2

( N1 )2
1
N1 −1

s2

+
2

=
=
=

s22 2
)
N2

( N11 +

( 0.102
56

( N2 )2
2

N2 −1
2
+ 0.126
)2
56

2

( 0.102
)2
56
55

2

( 0.126 )2

+ 5655
(4.693 · 10−4 )2

(5.3)

(1.858·10−4 )2 +(2.835·10−4 )2
55
−7

2.202 · 10
2.089 · 10−9

= 105.429
≈ 105
Because the confidence intervals shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 are both
calculated at the 95% level then so too will the statistical hypothesis tests here. For
a 95% confidence interval the alpha level gets set to α = 0.05. This alpha, along
with the degrees of freedom calculated in (5.3) are used as parameters to look up
the relevant t-score: t1−α,v = t0.95,105 = 1.659.
Recall back to the alternate hypothesis (5.1b) where x̄1 > x̄2 . So in order to
refute the null hypothesis (5.1a) T > t1−alpha,v must be true. In this example case of
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the naive Bayes data it is indeed correct that T = 4.155 > t1−α,v = t0.95,105 = 1.659.
Therefore we can disprove the null hypothesis.
This same procedure is repeated for the subsequent SVM and J48
comparisons with all results compiled in Table 5.1.

Table 5.3
Calculations for comparing two sample means.
Degrees of
Freedom

Critical
Value

Naive Bayes 4.155

105

1.659

SVM

1.213

98

1.661

J48

5.982

95

1.661

Algorithm

T

In order to refute the null hypothesis(H0 ), the test statistic T has to be
greater than the critical value (t1−α,v ). It is therefore trivial to see, using Table 5.3
as a reference, that in the cases of the naive Bayes classifier (4.155 > 1.659) and the
J48 classifier (5.982 > 1.661) we reject the null hypothesis. However, in the case of
the SVM classifier (1.213 ≯ 1.661) we fail to reject the null hypothesis.
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1.0

Algorithm Performance

+0.090

0.4

0.6

+0.145

TMR

Unigram

TMR

Unigram

TMR

0.0

Unigram

0.2

Accuracy (F1 score)

0.8

+0.024

Naive Bayes

Figure 5.2.

SVM

J48

Accuracy of the machine learning models grouped by

algorithm.

Figure 5.2 presents the same data seen in Figure 5.1 but with the accuracy
scores grouped according to the algorithm their model was trained on. This second
view makes it easier to observe the improved performance of the TMR-based models
over their unigram-based counterparts. The numbers astride the middle points of
the pairings quantify the difference in median values.
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5.3 Misclassified Samples
Examining which files were misclassified by the machine learning algorithms
provides insight into underlying problems.
Misclassified Files

Phish

Ham

TMR-J48

TMR-SVM

TMR-NB

Uni-J48

Uni-SVM

Uni-NB

Algorithm

0

0

4

4

8

8

12

12

16

16

20

20

24

24

0

0

4

4

8

8

12

12

16

16

20

20

24

24

Figure 5.3.

A plot of training files where the darkness of the cell

corresponds to the confidence with which they were misclassified.

The graphic in Figure 5.3 shows at a glance how files were misclassified by
each algorithm. A white rectangle indicates that a file was classified correctly while
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a colored rectangle indicates that the file was misclassified. The darkness of the
rectangle gives an indication of the confidence with which the file was
misclassified (Tufte, 1990, pp.91-93). It should be noted that the naive Bayes and
J48 algorithms provide a probability with their classifications while the SVM
algorithm only provides a boolean yes/no classification so all the probabilities are
either 1.0 (misclassified) or 0.0 (correctly classified). A comprehensive table with all
probabilities explicitly stated is included in Appendix A.
Several interesting features from Figure 5.3 jump out. First, the TMR-based
algorithms misclassify ham emails far less than the unigram-based algorithms do.
This is apparent by the lower density of colored rectangles in the TMR/Ham
quadrant (upper-right) of the graphic. Second, the J48 classifiers are less confident
when they misclassify files. The largest variety of shades of gray are seen in the
unigram and TMR J48 classifiers. The naive Bayes classifier also return a
probability with its classification but the unigram and TMR naive Bayes classifier
cells are almost uniformly black.
Another, more quantifiable, way of analyzing the differences in misclassified
files is by using the Jaccard index. The Jaccard index is a value between 0 and 1
that describes the similarity between two sets where 0 means completely dissimilar
and 1 means identical (Jaccard, 1912):
J(A, B) =

|A∩B|
|A∪B|

Applying the Jaccard index to misclassified files means that the performance
of two different algorithms can be compared to see if they’re misclassifying the same
or different files. Table 5.4 compares the same algorithm for its performance with
the unigram data set versus the semantic data set. Jaccard index values tell us that
the naive Bayes classifiers mostly misclassify the same files while the J48 decision
tree classifier performs very different on the two data sets. The SVM classifier is
evenly split with an index value of 0.500.
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Table 5.4
Jaccard indices of misclassified files by algorithm.
Algorithm

Intersection Union Jaccard

Naive Bayes

9

14

0.643

SVM

5

10

0.500

J48

3

17

0.176

There was only one situation in which all six data set/algorithm
combinations failed to correctly classify the email, and only two situations in which
give of the six combinations failed. All three of these files are phishing email
samples. Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 corroborate the fact that phishing samples are
those most consistently misclassified across algorithms.
Please review the attached invoice and pay this invoice at your
earliest convenience.

Feel free to contact us if you have any

questions.

Thank you.

Figure 5.4. The email that was misclassified by all the models.
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CURRENCY:HAS-MONETARY-VALUE:VALUE:175.00
≤0

>0

phish(10.0)

CORRUPT:THEME:VALUE:EMAIL-MESSAGE
>0

≤0

phish(11.0/1.0) EDUCATIONAL-CAMP:LOCATION:VALUE:BUILDING
>0

≤0

phish(3.0) WARN:STYLE-POLITENESS-1.0
>0

≤0

phish(2.0) ham(30.0/3.0)

Figure 5.5. The J48 tree trained from semantic features.

The benefit of the output structure seen in Figure 5.5 is that it is
human-readable. The same cannot be said about the J48 tree generated from
unigrams in Figure 5.6. The following list describes the TMR tree nodes in
descending order:
1. There is an amount of currency number 175 of some undefined denomination.
2. An email message was corrupted.
3. An organized, educational camp is being held inside of a particular building.
4. A polite warning.
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lafayes
≤0

>0

student

ham(11.0)

≤0

>0

attens

ham(5.0)

≤0

>0

purdu

ham(3.0)

≤0

>0

field

ham(3.0)
>0

≤0

ham(3.0/1.0) phish(31.0/4.0)

Figure 5.6. The J48 tree trained from uni-gram features.

The J48 tree model shown in Figure 5.6 differs significantly from the tree
model shown in Figure 5.5 despite having the same number of nodes. Notice how
the unigram strings are sometimes legible such as in the cases of “student” and
“field” but other times the strings have garbled endings such as “lafayes”, “attens”,
and “purdu.” These garbled endings are artifacts of the stemming process applied
prior to generating the machine learning model.
So unlike the TMR-trained tree of Figure 5.5 the unigram-trained tree
doesn’t provide individual nodes that are easily understood by a human. In this
particular situation, however, the nodes when examined collectively can provide
some information about the experiment. More specifically, all the unigram strings
seem to be describing an academic theme centered around Purdue University. And
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the tree model uses this Purdue-centric terms to identify when an email is good (as
opposed to identifying when it is phishing as in the TMR tree). This suggests that
the known good emails overly represent language particular to Purdue and its
activities. Further studies would do well to try a more diverse sampling of known
good emails to avoid this problem.

5.4 Ontology
During the manual TMR generation process the accompanying ontology was
generated from scratch. The result was 560 unique concepts. This ontology is
parsimonious in the sense that it is the minimal ontology necessary to describe the
language seen in the sample data. It is unlikely that the ontology as it currently
exists is sufficient to describe new data without further additions. In this way the
current ontology is not generalizable.
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Figure 5.7. A histogram of the number of fact instances for a concept
based on its height in the ontology.

Figure 5.7 shows how frequently (in terms of the logarithm) a concept is
instantiated into a fact versus its height in the ontology. Height of a tree-like data
structure begins at zero for the leaf nodes. Because the ontology created is
single-parented (multiple inheritance is not utilized) then its taxonomic structure is
a tree. The only concept with a height of seven would be the special purposed ALL
concept, which should never be instantiated.
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The histogram shoes an exponential curve with the leaf concepts occurring
far more frequently than their more highly placed parents. This means that the
TMRs generated by the research use the most fine-grained, specific concepts
available instead of relying on more abstract concepts with a higher height. For
example, if ANIMAL is a concept and DOG is also a concept that is the child of
ANIMAL, and a leaf node concept, then this data would suggest that DOG would
occur more frequently.
These data support the intuition that leaf node concepts should be seen more
frequently than their parent concepts. An overuse of abstract concepts might
suggest a problem in the TMR generation process that is causing an over-reliance
on abstract concepts.
The following steps demonstrate the problems caused by using overly
abstract concepts. It begins with Example 8. This is the input sentence to the OST
system.
(8) “The cat climbs up the tree.”
The OST system renders this sentence into the following frame:
(CLIMB−3
(AGENT (VALUE (CAT−9)))
(THEME (VALUE (TREE−102)))
)
But what would happen if instead of CAT and TREE, more abstract
concepts were used? For this example it is assumed that CAT is the direct subclass
of MAMMAL and TREE is the direct subclass of PLANT. The more abstract frame
then becomes:
(CLIMB−3
(AGENT (VALUE (MAMMAL−29)))
(THEME (VALUE (PLANT−44)))
)
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To better illustrate the problems created, translate the abstracted frame
back into an English sentence. The result might be that seen in Example 9. This is
a distinctly different sentence from Example 8 that served as input.
(9) “The mammal climbs up the plant.”
The use of the frequency-versus-height statistic is one tool available to future
acquisition efforts to help them analyze the health of their knowledge base.

5.5 Economics
Manually processing input texts into intermediate TMRs is a time
consuming task. Part way through the processing stage of the research the idea was
suggested to record the amount of time taken in processing each email. Processing
times for the last twenty-three of the total fifty-six samples emails was recorded.
Figure 5.8 plots the size of each of the twenty-three emails against the time it
took to process them. The straight line through the scatter plot is a linear
regression to the data. The linear regression itself has a coefficient of determination
(r2 ) of 0.923, which suggests a good fit to the observations.
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Figure 5.8. Amount of time taken to manually process sample emails.

The regression line from Figure 5.8 has potential use outside of this
dissertation. Given a text corpus for manual processing, the regression can help
predict how long it would take to process all the texts. This overall time can be
divided by the number of available team members to determine how long such a
project might take. Multiple the overall time by an hourly salary and that is the cost
to process the corpus. Both values are useful items to include in a grant proposal.
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Figure 5.9. Unigram-Naive Bayes models converging as the sample size
increases.

5.6 Convergence
The overall results use all fifty-six samples. There is a secondary question
remains of how the different machine learning algorithms converge on their solutions
as the number of samples increases.
Three sample sizes were chosen at regular intervals: 18, 36, and 54. All
samples were evenly split between the two classes (9, 18, and 27 respectively). As in
the earlier tests cross-validation is used as a means to avoid over-fitting but this
time with K=3. The same six combinations of machine learning algorithms and
datasets were trained and tested on these three subsamples.

5.7 Future Work
There are several different ways in which the research in this dissertation
could be extended or improved. The obvious first choice is to get larger amount of
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Unigram-SVM models converging as the sample size

increases.
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Figure 5.11. Unigram-J48 models converging as the sample size increases.
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Figure 5.12. TMR-Naive Bayes models converging as the sample size
increases.
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Figure 5.13. TMR-SVM models converging as the sample size increases.
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Figure 5.14. TMR-J48 models converging as the sample size increases.
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data. Some of the choices made for this research provided unnecessary and possibly
contributed to the small sample size.

5.7.1 Feature Space
This dissertation only scratches the surface of the features available for
training ML models. The ML models tested here were only trained on one possible
type of semantic feature.
1. Concept frequency
2. Local fact frequency
3. Two generations
4. Lexical mappings
Concept frequency Counting the frequency of individually occurring
concepts would be the simplest feature to take from a semantic understanding of a
phishing email. Concept counts weren’t utilized as features in this research due to
the possibility of them being virtually identical to unigrams. Recall that the text
used to generate the unigram language model was stripped of stop words. All the
remaining nouns, and the main verbs, would each have one concept that they map
to. Ignoring the auxiliary verbs, adjectives, and adverbs, this would have provided a
large degree of overlap between the unigram and TMR models.
Local fact frequency The currently used approach to identifying fact
instantiated from concepts is to give them globally unique identifiers. Thus,
HUMAN-43 in one document must be the same individual as HUMAN-43 in
another document. But there is also the possibility of facts with identifiers that are
unique only within the context of a specific text. The formalism suggested here to
to append an ascending letter sequence instead of a number to the end of a fact. So
a text referring to three different people would have HUMAN-A, HUMAN-B, and
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HUMAN-C in this text-local naming scheme as opposed to HUMAN-111,
HUMAN-112, and HUMAN-113 in the globally unique naming scheme.
This can help in identifying relations between individuals in an event. For
instance, the code block below shows a SPEAK event with globally unique facts.
(SPEAK−7
(AGENT (VALUE (HUMAN−88)))
(BENEFICIARY (VALUE (HUMAN−97)))
)
Compare that to this following code block, which uses only the concepts used
to instantiate the facts. If this frame is decomposed in quadruples then there is
hSPEAK, AGENT, VALUE, HUMANi and hSPEAK, BENEFICIARY, VALUE,
HUMANi. There is missing information to inform the machine learning software
that the two SPEAK instances are in fact the same one, and that the two HUMAN
instances are necessarily two different individuals.
(SPEAK
(AGENT (VALUE (HUMAN) ) )
(BENEFICIARY (VALUE (HUMAN) ) )
)
Text-specific fact labeling might solve that problem. Code block 5.7.1 shows
what this solution would look like.
(SPEAK−A
(AGENT (VALUE (HUMAN−A) ) )
(BENEFICIARY (VALUE (HUMAN−B ) ) )
)
The resulting decomposed quadruples are then hSPEAK-A, AGENT,
VALUE, HUMAN-Ai and hSPEAK-A, BENEFICIARY, VALUE, HUMAN-Bi,
which describe some of the distinctions between the facts.
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All of this begs the question of how to label these text-specific facts. The
initially proposed scheme is to label the facts with ascending letters according to
their descending frequency. So the fact appended with “-A” is the most frequently
occurring fact of that particular concept, “-B” is the second most frequently
occurring fact, so on and so forth.
Two generations The approach of decomposing intermediate TMRs into
quadruples used in this research could be described as looking at a single generation
of the TMR. A single generation in this case is connecting from a root concept to
the first filler. But a two generation feature would decompose an intermediate TMR
such that each feature connects from a root concept to the first filler and then on to
a second filler, that is in turn a filler of the first filler in the given feature. This
would be a 7-tuple, or a septuple.
(BUY−7
(AGENT (VALUE (HUMAN−3
(PLAYS−ROLE (VALUE (STUDENT−19)))
)))
)
The event in the above code block in the one generation ML feature scheme
would give two quadruples: hBUY-7, AGENT, VALUE, HUMAN-3i and
hHUMAN-3, PLAYS-ROLE, VALUE, STUDENT-19i. But in the two generation
scheme the same event generates only a single septuple: hBUY-7, AGENT, VALUE,
HUMAN-3, PLAYS-ROLE, VALUE, STUDENT-19i. This two generation scheme
captures what might be necessary information that the one generation scheme does
not; that it is in fact a student making the purchase and not just a generic person.
This improved scheme is important for capturing formalisms such as social roles
where concepts used as fillers are further specified.
This multi-generational ML feature begs the question of when are there too
many generations. Increasing the number of generations used to produce ML
features could cause an explosion in the overall number of features. This is a
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situation of diminishing returns. The question of where to stop the number of
generations is to be determined experimentally. This is also a place where ML
might offer assistance with techniques like information gain and principle
component analysis (PCA) identifying which ML features are contributing the most
to a classifier’s performance.
Lexical mappings are the mappings from the word as it appears in the text
and the fact it instantiated in the TMR. Lexical mappings were not recorded for
this research. It is known in NLP research that for polysemous words there is
usually only one sense of that word used in any given document ??. A new research
question might be: Do phishing emails use one particular sense of a word more often
than non-phishing emails, and might that be an effective way to distinguish the two?

5.7.2 Graph Theory
A proper, finished TMR is essentially a graph. It stands to reason then that
tools used to analyze graphs, such as social network analysis, might be useful in
answering questions about the knowledge represented in a TMR.
Future work should investigate how the network structures between good
and phishing emails differ. Tools like Gephi and R facilitate social network analysis.
But to conduct a proper examination would require experience with both graph
theory and the generation of ML features from graph structures, which were both
lacking at the time of this research.

5.8 Summary
Overall this research is considered a success. It met its primary goal of
building ML classifiers on semantic features in such a way as the results were not
random. Furthermore, the majority of these classifiers performed better than their
unigram counterparts on the same data.
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Not all avenues that were explored proved to be fruitful. The data collected
to conduct the research was delimited to be emails with PDF attachments. The
question was if the language in the emails that referred to the attachments might be
key in distinguishing good from phishing. No such connection was identified. There
is possible future research to be done in comparing phishing emails with PDF
malware attachments to other phishing emails with PDF attachments that are not
malware. The phishing email corpus collected for this particular research project
totalled just twenty-eight with only four of these phishing emails having malicious
attachments. Larger amounts of data must be examined to find sufficient samples
for such a future work.
This research intentionally focused on just the language used in the bodies of
email messages. No real, commercial product would restrict itself to such a
constrained set of indicators. This delimitation may have artificially lowered the ML
scores seen in this chapter. But the goal of this research was never to create a
contrived situation for the purpose of incrementally increasing a simple score.
This research also serves the purpose of showing that OST has practical
applications. Phishing is just one particular application. Stylometry,
anonymization, and sentiment analysis are all problems that might benefit from a
semantic approach.
OST is a theory undergoing continued development and refinement. While
machine learning might not be able to help develop that theory it could serve as a
tool for measuring progress. As new ideas as formalized, the expanded OST
resource could undergo a kind of regression testing to compare ML results from the
new structures to the ML results of the old structures.
Perhaps it could be said that successful research just leads to more questions?
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CHAPTER B. ANTLR GRAMMAR FOR INTERMEDIATE TMRS
This is the ANTLR grammar file that defines how an intermediate TMR file
used in this research must look. ANTLR is a parser generation tool for the Java
programming language. ANTLR will take this file as input and automatically
generate the necessary Java code for a parser. A programmer can then extend the
relevant classes in the ANTLR API to construct a walker that traverse the abstract
syntax tree created by the ANTLR-generated parser.
The grammar in this file is compatible with ANTLR version 4 (Parr, 2013).
ANTLR grammar definition files are not backwards compatible with previous
versions of ANTLR.
grammar Tmr ;

WS : [ \ t \ r \n]+ −> s k i p ;
LPAREN :

’( ’;

RPAREN :

’) ’;

NUMBER : [ 0 − 9 ] + ( ’ . ’ [ 0 − 9 ] + ) ?;
RANGE OPERATOR : ’ > ’ | ’>=’ | ’<=’ | ’ < ’;
RANGE : RANGE OPERATOR NUMBER;
BOOLEAN : ’TRUE’ | ’FALSE ’ ;
TIME : ’TIME ’ ;
TIME START : ’START’ ;
TIME END : ’END’ ;
FACET TYPE : ’VALUE’ | ’DEFAULT−MEASURE’ | ’NOT’ ;
SET : ’SET−’ NUMBER;
CARDINALITY : ’CARDINALITY ’ ;
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LOGIC : ’LOGIC ’ ;
SUBSET : ’SUBSET−OF’ ;
LOGIC TYPE : ’AND’ | ’OR’ | ’NOT’ | ’XOR’ ;
MODALITY : ’MODALITY’ ;
MODALITY TYPE : ’EPISTEMIC ’ | ’DEONTIC’ | ’VOLITIVE ’
| ’POTENTIAL’ | ’EPITEUCTIC’ | ’EVALUATIVE’
| ’SALIENCY ’ ;
STYLE : ’STYLE ’ ;
STYLE TYPE : ’POLITENESS’ | ’COLOR’ | ’FORMALITY’ ;
ASPECT : ’ASPECT’ ;
PHASE : ’PHASE’ ;
ITERATION : ’ITERATION ’ ;
STRING : ’ ” ’ ˜ [ ” ] ∗

’” ’;

LABEL : [ A−Z]+ ( ’ − ’ [ A−Z ] + ) ∗ ;
FACT : LABEL ’ − ’ NUMBER;

tmr : s t a t e m e n t +;

s t a t e m e n t : LPAREN s t a t e m e n t c o r e RPAREN;

s t a t e m e n t c o r e : (FACT | s e t )
( s l o t | time | m o d a l i t y | s t y l e | a s p e c t ) ∗ ;

s l o t : LPAREN LABEL f a c e t+ RPAREN;

f a c e t : LPAREN FACET TYPE f i l l e r + RPAREN;

f i l l e r : LPAREN f i l l e r v a l u e + RPAREN;
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f i l l e r v a l u e : LPAREN f i l l e r v a l u e RPAREN
| s t a t e m e n t c o r e | NUMBER | RANGE | LABEL | STRING
;

s e t : SET s e t p a r a m e t e r ∗ ;

s e t p a r a m e t e r : c a r d i n a l i t y | c o m p l e t e n e s s | type | i n c l u d e s
| excludes | l o g i c | subset ;

c a r d i n a l i t y : LPAREN CARDINALITY LPAREN (RANGE+ | NUMBER)
RPAREN RPAREN;

c o m p l e t e n e s s : LPAREN ’COMPLETE’ LPAREN BOOLEAN RPAREN RPAREN;

type : LPAREN ’TYPE’ LPAREN LABEL RPAREN RPAREN;

i n c l u d e s : LPAREN ’INCLUDES’ LPAREN (FACT | LABEL | SET)+
RPAREN RPAREN;

e x c l u d e s : LPAREN ’EXCLUDES’ LPAREN (FACT | LABEL | SET)+
RPAREN RPAREN;

l o g i c : LPAREN LOGIC LPAREN LOGIC TYPE RPAREN RPAREN;

s u b s e t : LPAREN SUBSET LPAREN SET RPAREN RPAREN;

time : LPAREN TIME ( a b s o l u t e t i m e | t i m e r a n g e | r e l a t i v e t i m e
| t i m e d u r a t i o n ) RPAREN;
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a b s o l u t e t i m e : LPAREN STRING RPAREN;

t i m e r a n g e : LPAREN s t a r t t i m e RPAREN (LPAREN e n d t i m e RPAREN) ?
| LPAREN e n d t i m e RPAREN;

s t a r t t i m e : TIME START LPAREN
(STRING | r e f e r e n c e t i m e | r e l a t i v e t i m e ) RPAREN;

e n d t i m e : TIME END LPAREN (STRING | r e f e r e n c e t i m e ) RPAREN;

r e l a t i v e t i m e : LPAREN ( ’PAST’ | ’PRESENT’ | ’FUTURE’ ) RPAREN;

r e f e r e n c e t i m e : (RANGE OPERATOR? FACT ’ . ’ TIME
( ’ . ’ (TIME START | TIME END) ) ? ) + ;

t i m e d u r a t i o n : LPAREN ’DURATION’ LPAREN LABEL LPAREN NUMBER
RPAREN RPAREN RPAREN;

m o d a l i t y p a i r : LPAREN MODALITY TYPE LPAREN (NUMBER | RANGE)
RPAREN RPAREN;

m o d a l i t y : LPAREN MODALITY ( m o d a l i t y p a i r )+ RPAREN;

s t y l e : LPAREN STYLE (LPAREN STYLE TYPE LPAREN (NUMBER | RANGE)
RPAREN RPAREN)+ RPAREN;

a s p e c t : LPAREN ASPECT ( i t e r a t i o n | phase ) RPAREN;

i t e r a t i o n : LPAREN ITERATION LPAREN (NUMBER | ’ FIRST ’ | ’LAST’ )
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RPAREN RPAREN;

phase : LPAREN PHASE LPAREN
( ’BEGIN’ | ’CONTINUE’ | ’END’ | ’OTHER’ ) RPAREN RPAREN;
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